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ABSTRACT 
Ethiopia, being one of the force-contributing countries to the East African 
Standby Brigade (EASBRIG) and given its, resources, strategic location, and its 
military’s long history, will have a significant role to play in creating a stable 
environment in the sub-region. This thesis analyzes the Organization of African 
Union/African Union (OAU/AU) efforts after the Cold War to restore security and ensure 
stability in the region and outlines the process of creating African Standby Forces (ASF) 
as sub-regional arrangements to bring stability and peace by preventing crises or 
responding to crises whenever they arise in the region. To fulfill such missions East 
African states have agreed to form the EASBRIG with each state contributing forces.  
This thesis also analyzes Ethiopia’s past and current participation in peace 
operations (from 1951 in Korea to ongoing missions in Liberia and Burundi) and argues 
that though Ethiopia’s participation in peace operations is commendable, many things 
could yet be improved and corrective measures need to be taken to better prepare for 
mission execution in regional and sub-regional crisis response efforts.  There is work yet 
to be done on peacekeeping and peace enforcement in particular. How to better organize 
Ethiopia's Peace Force and increase their efficiency and effectiveness for future peace 
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The end of the Cold War had a significant impact on Africa, which led the 
Organization of African Union (OAU) to increase its efforts to prevent conflict and 
respond to crises on the continent. Violence and instability have dominated the political 
and security scene on the continent of Africa for many years.  
After the crises in Rwanda and in Somalia in 1993–1994, crisis response by 
African nations became a burning issue. The rise of conflict in the region raised the 
question of how the sub-region could better keep the peace. In an effort to restore security 
and ensure stability in the region, the African Union (AU) member states moved 
aggressively to find ways to prevent crises before they happened and to manage and 
respond once they arose. African countries have come to an agreement that the sub-
regional crisis response mechanism should be reinforced by the creation of African 
Standby Forces (ASF). Accordingly, African countries came to a common understanding 
that if the ASF was up and running it could possibly strengthen or replace existing United 
Nations (UN) peacekeeping missions in various trouble spots in Africa. The AU 
authorized the creation of the ASF in 2002. The aim of the creation of this force was not 
only to support peace missions, but also to intervene militarily to prevent conflicts from 
escalating. Any decision to intervene has to be approved by the AU's General Assembly. 
All African nations that comprise the AU are expected to take steps to establish their own 
standby military contingents for participation in peacekeeping missions to be authorized 
by the Peace and Security Council of the AU.  
Following this decision of the AU, eleven East African states came to an 
agreement to form the East African Standby Brigade (EASBRIG) with each state 
contributing forces. The Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD) took the 
lead in organizing this effort.  However, IGAD lacked the command and control 
structures necessary to provide technical and political coordination. While IGAD 
successfully organized the formation and operationalization of the Brigade, it recently 
decided that an independent EASBRIG Coordinating Mechanism should replace it. Now 
2it is up to the troop-contributing countries to do their parts by preparing their contingents 
for the fulfillment of the Brigade’s mission, which is to bring stability and peace by 
preventing crises or responding to crises whenever they arise in the sub-region. Ethiopia, 
being one of the force contributing countries, has been elected to host the Headquarters 
(HQ) of the Brigade with responsibility for assigning the Brigade Commander from the 
Ethiopian Defense Forces. This means that Ethiopia will have a significant role to play in 
creating a stable environment in the sub-region by contributing troops and the 
commander to the EASBRIG.  
Ethiopia has always been at the forefront of the countries that positively and 
immediately respond to calls by the UN for troop contributions ever since the UN’s 
formation. Since 1951, Ethiopia has participated in five UN peace missions. Ethiopia’s 
contribution to the crisis response effort of the region and the sub-region is thus 
historically secure. The question is how Ethiopia's Peace Force should be organized in 
order to increase its efficiency and effectiveness for future peace operations. Finding 
relevant answers is the goal of this thesis. 
B. RELEVANCE  
Ethiopia is the only country in Africa that has never been colonized. Ethiopia was 
among the very few African states to be a founding member of the League of Nations. 
Ethiopia’s contribution to the liberation of African states and the foundation of the OAU 
clearly indicates its devotion to the development of Africa. Beyond this, Ethiopia has a 
long history in peace operations since the creation of the UN. Ethiopia, being one of the 
founding states of the UN, rendered its support to repel invaders in Korea (1951–1953) 
and in Congo from 1961 to 1964 under the concept of collective security. In addition, 
Ethiopia participated in Rwanda peacekeeping operations in the 1990s and is still 
participating in efforts in Burundi and Liberia.  
However, given Ethiopia’s resources, strategic location, and its military’s long 
history, one could say that Ethiopia has much more yet to contribute. The author believes 
that for these reasons, among others, Ethiopia’s participation in peace operations in the 
sub-region, region, and under UN auspices elsewhere should be intensified. However, in 
order to make a noticeable contribution to multinational peace operations, Ethiopia must 
also restructure and reorganize its Peace Force. 
3Ethiopia, being one of the force-contributing countries to the EASBRIG, is 
expected to play a significant role in the realization of the Brigade’s mission. In order to 
play a meaningful role in  sub-regional crisis responses, Ethiopian peace troops should be 
well organized, trained, equipped, and prepared to participate in missions such as 
peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and peace building. Thus, preparing a competent 
Peace Force in Ethiopia is crucial.  
Though Ethiopia’s past and current participation in peace operations is 
commendable, many things could be improved and corrective measures need to be taken 
for still better mission execution. Because it is likely Ethiopian participation in future 
regional and sub-regional peacekeeping operations (PKO) will significantly increase, this 
thesis argues for preparation that is more intensive. The author also argues that there 
should be an independent and responsible office in place to ensure a planned system for 
training, deployment, and command and control. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Questions addressed in this thesis are:  
a. What were the driving factors for the OAU/AU to create ASF?  
b. What are the measures being taken to form and use the sub-regional Peace 
Force?  
c. How have sub-regional peacekeeping forces been used in the region? 
d. What are some of the lessons learned by African peacekeeping missions 
for EASBRIG? 
e. How might one expect EASBRIG to be deployed in the future? 
1. What kind of force structure will or should it have? 
2. What kind of training and preparation does this demand? 
3. What kind of command and control is needed? 
4. What may be the future major challenges for EASBRIG? 
f. What are the past and present practices of the Ethiopian Peace Force? 
g. What are the current strengths and weaknesses vis-à-vis peacekeeping of 
the Ethiopian Peace Force? 
h. How might the strengths of the Ethiopian Peace Force be maximized and 
weaknesses overcome? 
i. What is to be done to intensify Ethiopia’s future participation in peace 
operations? 
4D. METHODOLOGY 
In this thesis, the author combines historical and background analysis of regional 
and sub-regional crisis management and response, and explore Ethiopia’s historic role in 
bringing peace and stability to the African continent and beyond.  To gain first hand 
information, The author conducted interviews with Ethiopian soldiers and officers who 
participated in previous peace operations. He also reviewed primary and secondary 
materials in regards to Ethiopian peacekeeping practices, both past and present. 
E. ORGANIZATION  
This thesis is organized as follows. Chapter II presents the background of 
OAU/AU efforts to find a solution to the recurrence of major crises in the region. This 
chapter also examines the fundamental factors that led the organization to establish sub-
regional standby forces, as well as their achievements to date.  
Chapter III analyzes the implementation of the AU’s new sub-regional standby 
approach to crisis management and response, and IGAD’s current role and activities in 
the creation of the East African Standby Brigade.   
Chapter IV discusses Ethiopia’s experiences in past and present peacekeeping 
missions. This chapter identifies Ethiopia's peacekeeping troops’ strengths and major 
practices that should be kept and developed, and weaknesses that should be improved 
upon. 
Chapter V reviews the past and present performance of Ethiopian peace missions. 
By discussing how strengths might be maximized and weaknesses overcome, the author 
offers suggestions about how one might better organize and prepare efficient Peace 
Forces that can be deployed for any peace operations, not only in the sub-region but 
throughout the region more generally and, when necessary, globally. 
Chapter VI presents conclusions and recommendations for the further 
improvement of Ethiopian Peace Force, with the aim of maximizing Ethiopia’s 
contribution to sub-regional, regional, and global peace operations.  
5II. END OF COLD WAR: NEW APPROACH TO AFRICAN 
CONFLICT RESOLUTION 
A. BACKGROUND: THE OAU PRE–COLD WAR APPROACH TO 
CONFLICT IN AFRICA 
The OAU was caught in its perennial dilemma to promote peace in cases 
of civil war while at the same time condemning all secessionist 
movements and always supporting the government in power. These 
positions, although understandable, severely limited the peacemaking 
effectiveness of the OAU since its founding (Smock, 1993, pp. 8-9). 
Since the early 1960s, in the beginning of the post-independence era, many wars 
have erupted in Africa. Some of them were interstate, but most were intrastate conflicts. 
The increase in ethnic and nationalist feelings was the major reason for many of these 
wars, especially those fought in the name of self-determination. Secessionist wars waged 
by one ethnic or national group for creation of a new state, in the interests of that group, 
represented the prevailing phenomenon in Africa. Though ethnicity has been one source 
of war, however, the other factor that intensifies the ethnic grievances has been bad 
governance. Bad governance typically restricts the participation of different ethnicities in 
the decision-making and power-sharing processes of the state. In Ethiopia, as well in the 
previous regimes, inadequate and unfair forms of resource allocation along ethnic lines 
proved to be major factors that led to protracted intrastate conflict. Intrastate conflict in 
Africa usually occurs because a party, group, tribe, or faction seeks to seize power 
through either a military coup or an insurgent movement. Most of the intrastate conflicts 
have been made possible thanks to the training, equipment, and sanctuary offered by 
other states, whether African or extra-African (Diouf, 1998). 
The other cause of conflict in Africa has been the effect of the creation of colonial 
borders. This resulted in a division of many ethnicities being located in different 
countries.  After liberation, some countries engaged in war with the desire to unite 
members of the same ethnic groups found in neighboring countries. “Africa has 103 
examples of borders that divided ethnic groups, are the subject of dispute between 
neighboring states, or produce secessionist or irredentist conflict” (James Busumtwi-Sam, 
61999, p. 260). One of these examples could be Somalia, which waged war against 
Ethiopia, claiming that the Ogaden Somalis were a part of Great Somalia. 
The OAU, since its creation in 1964 to the early 1990s, had no definite 
mechanism by which to enable the organization to resolve conflicts within or between 
states.  
Since 1970, Africa has suffered more than thirty wars; most of these have 
had intrastate origins. A recent study has documented that from 1990 to 
1997 sixteen wars took place in Africa. Fourteen were intrastate conflicts 
(Algeria, Angola, Chad, Ethiopia, Liberia, Mozambique, Rwanda, Sierra 
Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Uganda, Western Sahara, and 
Zaire); only two were interstate (Chad/Libya and Rwanda/Uganda) (Rene, 
2002, p. 1). 
The organization’s charter did not allow it to intervene before conflicts actually 
erupted and therefore no conflict prevention role was foreseen for the organization. 
Intervening or playing any role in intrastate conflicts was absolutely out of the question 
(Faria, 2004). The focus of the OAU was on respecting sovereign equality of member 
states, non-interference in their internal affairs, and respect for their territorial integrity.  
That was the reason the OAU, since its creation, showed reluctance to involve itself in 
civil wars.  The principle of non-interference restricted the organization’s involvement to 
situations where there was clear involvement of external military intervention. For 
example, the OAU remained silent for 30 years in regards to the internal conflict in 
Ethiopia between the central government and Eritrean Peoples Liberation Front (EPLF) 
which started in 1961 and ended in 1991. This resulted in Eritrea gaining its 
independence and 17 years of guerrilla war for the overthrow of the Mengistu 
Government. The Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) 
accomplished this overthrow. 
Many believed the OAU would be the ideal body to resolve Africa’s conflicts. 
When the end of the Cold War caused the withdrawal of the United Soviet Socialist 
Republic (USSR) and United States (U.S.), it became clearer to many African leaders that 
they should strengthen their concerted efforts in order to resolve continuous African 
problems. Pressure by the Western countries to do so also intensified this desire. Western 
countries exerted pressure, on the one hand, by promising and giving some incentives to 
7African states and, on the other hand, by warning the African states that there would not 
be substantive help unless they moved towards solving their problems themselves. This 
situation forced the African Heads of State to work together toward the peaceful and 
rapid resolution of conflicts. 
A 1990 Declaration of the OAU Heads of State and Government recognized that 
the prevalence of conflicts in Africa was seriously obstructing their collective efforts to 
tackle the continent’s economic problems.  
B. AFRICA'S NEW POST–COLD WAR APPROACH TO CONFLICT 
PREVENTION MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION 
1. The Kampala Conference 
The end of the Cold War had numerous effects on the political climate in Africa. 
The situation in the world in the 1990s renewed the hope for realizing peace and 
development in Africa. “It was in anticipation of these post–[Cold  War] developments 
that the normative framework of a Conference on Security, Stability, Development, and 
Cooperation in Africa (CSSDCA) was conceived by the Africa Leadership Forum 
(ALF)” (Deng and Zartman, 2002, p. xiv), under the then retired President of the 
Republic of Nigeria, Olusengun Obasanjo, the founding chairman of the forum. This 
forum was held in Kampala, Uganda in May 1991. Noted at the time were the withdrawal 
of the superpowers from the continent, the efforts of countries towards democracy, the 
end of apartheid in South Africa, and the wave of competitive elections that had been 
held in nearly thirty countries (Deng and Zartman, 2002, p. 1). These events created 
strong optimism about the opportunity of Africans to solve their own problems. On the 
other hand, according to Deng and Zartman (2002) “the emergence of a new international 
system made Africans fears the consequences of the super–powers’ abandonment and 
their increasing marginalization” (p. 109). 
The Kampala Document specified the creation of CSSDCA proposals for 
principles and standards and for specific mechanisms. Though the Kampala Document 
was praised by many as a framework for a new beginning that would foster the security, 
stability, development and cooperation for the continent (Deng and Zartman, 2002, p. 
xv), it raised several contentious issues in its efforts to institute a new normative  
 
8consensus. It threatened the power positions of a few governments that felt insecure due 
to domestic issues. One of the Kampala principles that focused on the security issue of 
Africa was Article 4 that stated:  
The interdependence of Africa states and the link between their security, 
stability, and development demand a common African agenda based on a 
unity of purpose and a collective political consensus derived from a firm 
conviction that Africa cannot make any significant progress on any other 
front without creating collectively a lasting solution to its problems of 
security and stability (Deng, and Zartman, 2002, p. 7). 
After a year of study of the Kampala Document, the OAU Secretariat proposed an 
initiative on conflict management in 1992 at a summit in Dakar. The content of the 
document mainly focused on the anticipation of potential conflicts and their prevention. 
Proposals regarding mechanisms were essentially adopted by the OAU after a year of 
study at the Cairo Summit in 1993. 
2. The Cairo Decision — Conflict Management, Prevention, and 
Response 
Following the end of the Cold War in Africa, many conflicts came to an end. 
According to Ali and Matthews (1999), some of the highlights were the “peace accord of 
1988 in Southwestern Africa [which] led to the independence of Namibia in 1990; 
agreement of 1991 [which] appeared to bring peace to Angola; another, signed in 1992, 
ended the war in Mozambique” (p. 257).  The EPLF and the EPRDF likewise achieved 
success and brought the emergence of Africa’s newest independent state (Eritrea) and the 
creation of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, respectively. 
However even as these peaceful developments appeared in Africa, “new conflicts 
were erupting, and older conflicts intensifying. In Liberia, in 1989, a civil war broke out 
that threatened to spill over into neighboring countries; in Rwanda, civil war began in 
1990; and in 1992, a conflict that had been raging since 1982 in Somalia degenerated into 
a human disaster of unprecedented magnitude” (Ali and Matthews, 1999, p. 257).   
In the 1990s, intrastate conflicts like these had a disastrous impact on stability and 
development in their sub-regions, coupled with the decreasing involvement of the 
international community. This continued to put pressure on African states to address 
these problems. “Moreover, there were more pressures from the international community 
9and African public opinion, [which] have pushed the OAU to engage more actively in 
conflict prevention and management in the region” (Faria,  2004). 
During the OAU Summit held in Cairo in 1993, African Heads of States 
recognized that the presence of peace and stability was a necessary precondition for 
social and economic development. The assembly thus voted for the establishment of a 
Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution (MCPMR). This 
resolution was not the result of immediate actions, however, since it was an issue that had 
been analyzed for three years. According to Juma and Aida (2002), a report submitted by 
the Africa program of the international peace academy to the Ford Foundation indicated 
that the mechanism of the resolution identified three aims: “first, to anticipate and prevent 
situations of potential conflict from developing into full-blown wars; second, to 
undertake peacemaking and peace building efforts if full-blown conflicts should arise; 
and third, to carry out peacemaking and peace building activities in post conflict 
situations.” However, since the formation of this mechanism many obstacles, such as the 
limited resources of the OAU Peace Fund to control conflict management issues and the 
failure of member states to meet their financial obligations, hindered the effectiveness of 
the Mechanism from realizing its objective. 
Despite these problems, the OAU Mechanism enabled intervention in matters that 
previously would have been considered to be purely “internal.” “In its work, the OAU 
Conflict Management Center has used a range of preventive tools including applying 
political pressure, issuing regular statements, endorsing sanctions against military 
regimes and undertaking direct mediation between parties” (Juma and Aida, 2002, p. 23). 
Consequently, foreign powers were also putting pressure on African leaders to 
speed up the realization of their conflict resolution mechanism. For example, during the 
November 1994 French-African Summit, President Mitterrand declared, “The time has 
come for Africans themselves to resolve their conflicts and organize their own security.”1 
 
 
                                                 
1 President Mitterrand, 1994. Speech in the French-African Summit. 
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When it came to implementing the OAU’s mechanism and responding to the 
international community, it was expected that the OAU would deploy forces either to 
manage an existing conflict or would prevent tense situations from deteriorating into 
open warfare. With its limited capacity to mount full-scale peacekeeping operations in 
the first place, the OAU had to seriously consider organizing its peacekeeping forces. 
Such responsibility demanded creating and maintaining African troops available for UN 
peacekeeping operations in Africa. The solution seemed to be to lobby African countries 
to set aside peacekeeping forces for use in case of emergency. However, it was obvious 
that to enhance its capacity to prevent conflicts from arising and prevent them from 
escalating, as well as to resolve conflicts, the OAU needed to explore ways of working 
with other conflict management institutions within and beyond Africa.  
C. ACRI — THE U.S. CAPACITY-BUILDING INITIATIVE FOR THE 
REALIZATION OF MCPMR 
Given the awful situation in Rwanda and the withdrawal of UNISOM II (United 
Nations Mission in Somalia) in March 1995, which left Somalia to the warlords, the U.S. 
sought a new peacekeeping solution that made Africans responsible in resolving their 
problems. Following the withdrawal of UN forces from Somalia, the United Nations 
secretary-general, Kofi Annan, expressed concern for African security in his November 
1995 report entitled “Improving Preparedness for Conflict Prevention and Peacekeeping 
in Africa.” In it, he suggested Africa “should seriously endeavor to develop and enhance 
its capacity to participate in the field of peacekeeping.” In addition, African governments 
and armies were besieged with challenges due to a lack of experienced personnel, 
insufficient material resources, and slow deployment of troops. Consequently, Kofi 
Annan (1995) appealed to the international community “to help enhance the capacity of 
African peacekeepers.” Consequently, 
mainly the U.S., Great Britain and France, unwilling to intervene in 
conflicts in Africa but aware of the problems there, have created program 
aims to support and develop African capabilities to deal with conflict 
situation. Although these programmes vary considerably, they all focus in 
one way or another on providing training, equipment, or financial 
assistance to African countries directly or through regional organizations 
(Faria, 2004). 
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In early 1997, the U.S. endorsed the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI). 
This was mainly a proposal to provide training for several African countries to create the 
capacity for peacekeeping that might be used in the future whenever a crisis would arise. 
The idea was to prepare a rapid deployment force in countries to enable them to respond 
to military crises in African countries before they reached catastrophic levels. The ACRI 
proposal revealed, on the one hand, that the U.S. tried to avoid contribution of forces 
directly to peacekeeping in Africa and, on the other hand, still wanted to maintain 
political influence and military linkages to African states.  
The U.S. believed that “the most important element of any peacekeeping 
operation on the ground is trained and adequately equipped personnel” (“Conflict 
Trends,” 2002). “Accordingly, the U.S. planned to prepare “eight to ten commonly 
trained equipped and interoperable African battalions (six hundred to eight hundred 
soldiers each) with four to six specialized companies for combat support/combat service 
support” (Kwiatkowski, 2000, p. 5). By mid-1997, seven countries had already 
committed themselves to be trained. Ethiopia also expressed its commitment to 
participate in the ACRI.  
In the summer of 1998, an advanced group from the ACRI pilot team had come 
and conducted preliminary discussions with the Ethiopian Training Department in which 
the author participated. During this visit, they first observed the condition of Ethiopia’s 
battalions to ensure that they met the minimum requirements.  Then, since the author was 
the Head of the Military Training Main Section in the MOD Training Department, he 
participated in the planning and organizational meetings of the Ethiopian ACRI program. 
The ACRI advance team and the author, representing the Training Department, went to 
see the selected training center, namely the Hurso Military Training Center. After 
reconnaissance, the U.S. team found it an appropriate and adequate place for the training. 
Despite Ethiopia’s willingness, however, the training for Ethiopia was delayed because of 
the Ethio-Eritrean border dispute, which erupted in May 1998. 
“ACRI training emphasizes commonality of communications, basic soldiering 
skills, and specific military activities required in peacekeeping with the ultimate objective 
of helping African military units meet UN standards in peacekeeping and humanitarian 
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relief practices” (Rotberg, 2000, pp. 72–73).  Although ACRI’s plan was to train 12,000 
African troops for peacekeeping over a five-year period when the program ended in 2002, 
9,000 troops had been trained and three multinational exercises conducted in eight 
countries (Benin, Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Senegal and Uganda) 
(Faria, 2004). 
ACRI was the first attempt to create African peacekeeping forces that could be 
readily available and deployed in case of a crisis. It should be noted that the U.S. 
initiative laid the groundwork for further analyzing the reorganizing and preparing of 
sub-regional peacekeeping forces to deploy under one command for the purpose of 
preventing and resolving conflicts. The ACRI program has made its own contribution and 
evolved into creation of a new African Standby Force.  
When ACRI ended in 2002, the United States adopted a new program called the 
African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA), which is still active. 
Its aim is to:  
• Train and equip African militaries to respond to peace support and 
complex humanitarian requirements 
• Build and enhance sustainable African peace support training capacity 
• Build effective  command and control 
• Provide commonality and interoperability  
• Enhance international, regional, and sub-regional peace support capacity 
in Africa (Faria, 2004). 
D. AFRICAN UNION AND ITS VISION 
1. The Birth of a New Vision on Conflict Resolutions in Africa 
The launching of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development 
(NEPAD) at the OAU summit of July 2001 and the transformation of the 
OAU [into] the African Unity (AU) in July 2002 have further reinforced 
trends towards greater pan-African cooperation and commitment to 
address conflict-related issues on the continent and developing African 
capabilities to deal with them (Faria, 2004). 
With the transformation of the OAU into the AU, conflict resolution and security 
have taken on an even higher priority. With these developments, external partners have 
become increasingly enthusiastic about readdressing Africa’s problems. As William 
Nhara, coordinator of conflict prevention and research in the OAU’s Division of Conflict 
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Management, noted, “Regional organizations should realize that there is a need to take on 
the primary responsibility for their own problems, especially those relating to issues of 
peace, security and stability” (Rotberg, 2000, p. 23). Many regard the emergence of an 
activist African Union with a modern, forward-looking agenda as one of the most 
important developments on the continent in decades. The need for a common African 
defense and security policy and the need for establishment of a single continental army 
were stressed during the Inaugural Summit of the AU held in Durban, South Africa, in 
July 2002. “Africa therefore continues to demonstrate eagerness in taking responsibility 
for its destiny, based on initiatives aimed at enabling its people to tackle their own 
problems following an African agenda, managed by Africans and designed to promote 
and foster the continent’s interest, with the active involvement of the international 
community” (Alusala, 2004). 
At the same time, African leaders themselves emphasized the need to build up the 
continent's own peace capacities. These include not only the ability to organize standby 
forces to mount peacekeeping missions, but also to mediate political disputes before they 
erupt into war, broker peace talks in ongoing conflicts, and better coordinate support for 
countries just emerging from war (Harsch, 2003, p. 1). African states and organizations 
quite reasonably prefer that African forces, rather than non-African troops, be the first 
approach to conflict on the continent. The Constitutive Act of the AU in Article 4(d) 
points to the need for the establishment of a common defense policy for the African 
continent (Constitutive Act of AU, 2002). This reflects African leaders’ conviction that 
“in cases where political agreement and preparations for a UN Mission oftentimes 
involve months of delay, a deployment by peacekeeping forces from the African Union 
or other sub-regional organization is often the only response tool available” (Frazer, 
2005). 
2. African Standby Forces, Purpose, Structure, Mission Command and 
Control 
Pursuant to the AU 2002 Inaugural Summit at which African Heads of State and 
Government signed the Protocol for the establishment of the Peace and Security Council 
(PSC), the African Standby Forces (ASF) and the Military Staff Committee (MSC) were 
established.  During the implementation phase of the AU decision, the AU defense chief 
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of staff held a meeting in May 2003 and developed plans for the creation of a permanent 
force under the Peace and Security Council by 2010. The establishment of an African 
Standby Force would have the capability of rapid deployment and be ready to intervene 
in situations of armed conflict or genocide to keep or enforce the peace. The ASF is to be 
organized in a two-phased implementation process: the first phase is aimed at developing 
the capacity to manage scenarios one to three by mid-2005, while the second phase is 
aimed at developing the capability to manage the remaining scenarios by 2010.2 The 
model for the formation of standby forces was taken from the formation of the 
Multinational Standby Forces High-Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG).3 The ASF would be 
comprised of standby brigades in each of the five regions and incorporate a police and 
civilian expert capacity (Kent and Malan, 2003). 
ASF peace and security responsibilities are broad, with the force expected to 
serve multiple, diverse purposes. The Peace and Security Council Protocol provides that 
the ASF shall: 
• Observe and monitor missions 
• Conduct other types of peacekeeping missions 
• Intervene in the affairs of a member state during grave circumstances or at 
its request to restore peace and security 
• Conduct preventive deployment 
                                                 
2 The proposed structure of the African Standby Force (ASF) is based on six conflict mission scenarios 
requiring a rapid response: Scenario 1: AU/Regional military advice to a political mission, for example in Côte 
d’Ivoire. Deployment timeline of 30 days; Scenario 2: AU/Regional observer mission co-deployed with a UN mission, 
for example OAU/AU Liaison Mission in Ethiopia-Eritrea (OLMEE). Deployment timeline of 30 days; Scenario 3: 
Stand alone AU/Regional observer mission, for example AU mission in the Comoros (AMIC). Deployment timeline of 
30 days; Scenario 4: AU/Regional peacekeeping force (PKF) for Chapter VI and preventive deployment mission (and 
peace-building), for example AU mission in Burundi (AMIB). Deployment timeline of 30 days; Scenario 5: AU PKF 
for complex multidimensional peacekeeping mission, including those involving low-level spoilers. Deployment 
timeline for complete ASF deployment within 90 days with military component deployed within 30 days; Scenario 6: 
AU intervention, for example in genocide situations where the international community does not act promptly. 
Deployment timeline of 14 days.  
3 Rotberg, Robert. I. 2000 Peacekeeping and peace enforcement in Africa: method of conflict prevention. 
Brookings Institution Press, p 87. The UN realized the importance of having the capability for rapid deployment of 
peacekeeping forces to avoid the time lapse between the decision of the Secretary Council to mandate an operation and 
the actual deployment of troops in the mission area. The inception of the UN Standby Arrangements System (UNSAS) 
was a result of recommendations by a study group in 1993. The system establishes standby forces able to be deployed, 
in whole or in part, anywhere in the world, at the Secretary General‘s request for UN duties as mandated by the 
Security Council.  In December 1996, on Danish initiative, Austria, Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, 




• Conduct peace-building operations, including post-conflict disarmament 
and demobilization 
• Provide humanitarian assistance to alleviate the suffering of people in 
conflict and disaster areas 
• Perform other functions the Peace and Security Council or the AU 
mandates (Neethling, 2005) 
Only when a crisis has gone beyond the capacity of African institutions to 
respond should military intervention by the international community be considered. 
With the development of this new capabilities, many say that “Africa will no 
longer simply be the source of troops but will be at the centre of determining the degree 
of success operationally, nurturing a culture of common approach to military 
professionalism in the long term” (Mtimkulu, 2005). Since it consists of multidisciplinary 
contingents, the ASF is envisioned to have civilian and military components stationed in 
their home countries and be ready for call-up and deployment, but they are organized, 
trained and exercised according to UN doctrine, guidelines, and standards in a 
synchronized and coherent fashion so that they will be ready to be deployed together 
when the appropriate authorization has been received (De Coning, 2005). However, the 
establishment of ASF represents but a step in the process. To deploy, manage, equip, and 
supply the sub-regional standby forces to achieve the desired result will demand intensive 























































III. AFRICAN SUB-REGIONAL PEACE FORCES 
A. THE EAST AFRICAN MOVE IN CREATING AN EAST AFRICAN 
STANDBY BRIGADE (EASBRIG) 
1. The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and its 
Role in the Creation of EASBRIG 
The ASF would be comprised of standby brigades in each of the five African 
regions. The sub-regions are emerging as the principal actors in recent peace initiatives 
and operations on the continent. In this regard, the countries that belong to IGAD 
comprise one of the sub-regions of Africa, which represents the Eastern part of Africa. 
The Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Desertification (IGADD) was 
established in 1986 with the objective to act as an early warning mechanism for alerting 
the international community of impending humanitarian emergencies and to coordinate 
resources in response to crises on the Horn of Africa (Profile IGAD, 2005). The main 
purpose of this cooperation was restricted to issues of drought, desertification, and food 
security.  
However, the absence of a military or security component endangered the security 
of economic, social, and political developments, and member states started to confront 
these problems collectively. In March 1996, in an effort to tackle the security problem of 
the sub-region, leaders of the IGADD signed an agreement that transformed the 
organization into the IGAD (Profile IGAD, 2005). The issue of conflict management, 
prevention, and resolution became the mandate of this newly transformed organization. 
Article 18 of the IGAD Establishing Agreement asserts that member states shall act 
collectively to preserve peace, security, and stability in order to facilitate economic 
development in their countries and in the sub-region. The organization’s primary focus 
was to maintain peace, security, and stability in the Horn of Africa. Along these lines, 
since its inception, IGAD has been extensively involved in peace efforts in southern 
Sudan via the Sudan Peace Process, and in the Somalia via the process that led to the 
restoration of a transitional government there in 1999. 
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Eastern African countries are strongly committed to establishing an East African 
Standby Brigade, in line with the requirements of the AU PSC. It has been decided by the 
East African states that IGAD shall play an interim coordination role (“Policy 
Framework,” 2005). Accordingly, in implementing the AU Commission’s requirements, 
IGAD convened the Jinja Meeting of Experts in February 2004 to establish the East 
African Standby Brigade. It was noted that, once established, EASBRIG would 
encompass thirteen East African countries. These thirteen countries are the seven member 
countries of IGAD: Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, and Uganda and 
Comoros plus Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, Madagascar, and Tanzania, which are not 
yet members of IGAD, but are countries located in the sub-region. However, in April 
2005, at the Summit of the Heads of State and Government held in Addis Ababa, 
Ethiopia, Tanzania and Mauritius were officially removed from the membership of 
EASBRIG (Report of the meeting of Eastern African CDS, 2005). Therefore, EASBRIG 
is going to be formed by the contributions of 11 countries of the region. 
IGAD in having fulfilled its role of organizing EASBRIG successfully then 
transferred its organizing responsibility to another body. The 3rd Meeting of the East 
African States’ Council of Ministers of Defense and  Security, which was held on 
September 15, 2005, in Kigali, Rwanda, was held on the recommendation of the 4th
 
Meeting of the Eastern Africa Chiefs of Defense Staff and approved the establishment of 
an independent Coordinating Mechanism for EASBRIG to take over from IGAD 
(Rotberg, 2000, p. 11). 
2. EASBRIG Overview 
Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi told the conference held in the Ethiopian 
capital in April 11, 2005 to sign an agreement to contribute to the East African Standby 
Brigade.  
This [EASBRIG] is critical for peace and stability in our region. We are 
still not out of the woods as far as conflict is concerned. The memory of 
Rwanda's genocide figured greatly in the mission envisioned for the 
ASF, Africa and the whole international community were unable to do 
anything to prevent or stop the genocide in Rwanda. This underscores the 
need for us to move with resolve and speed to establish the mechanisms  
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necessary to prevent such occurrences… the broader African Standby 
Force should intervene at short notice to save lives and property in conflict 
situations (Geeska Africa online & Han, 2005). 
The aim of EASBRIG is to have contributing countries within the sub-regional 
framework designate military units to join the crisis response force. So far, Ethiopia, 
Sudan, Kenya, Djibouti, Uganda, and Madagascar have pledged to contribute different 
types of forces to EASBRIG. Ethiopia pledged one light infantry battalion with organic 
transport, one company of engineers, one de-mining company, one signal platoon, and 
one Level II medical unit.4 These forces will be trained in their countries and according 
to common doctrines, and will also be trained together with established communications, 
intelligence, and command and control prescriptions. 
EASBRIG’s mission will be based on six possible mission scenarios developed 
for ASF by the AU:  
a. Military advice to a political mission 
b. An AU observer mission co-deployed with a UN peacekeeping mission 
c. A stand-alone AU observer mission 
d. A traditional peacekeeping or preventative deployment mission 
e. Complex multi-dimensional peace operations 
f. Peace enforcement (what the ASF Framework document refers to as 
intervention missions) (De Coning, 2005). 
3. EASBRIG: Force Structure 
As described above, creation of a force would not mean the creation of a standing 
brigade. It has been decided that the EASBRIG headquarters and the Planning Element 
(PLANELM) would be permanent to allow for planning and training. The components of 
the brigade would be resident in their own countries and would be part of the UN 
Standby Arrangement System.  
The EACDS recognized that the quantities they relied on were derivatives of the 
UN specifications that entail the following Tables of Organization and Equipment 
(TOEs): 
                                                 
4 Level II medical support includes evacuation from level I, triage resuscitation and stabilization, sustaining 
treatment for those requiring further evacuation, reinforcement to level I organizations, and centralization of medical 
supplies; retrieved on Aug 16, 2006  from http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/glossary/l.htm   
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• Brigade (mission level); headquarters support unit of up to 65 personnel 
and 16 vehicles 
• Headquarters company and support unit of up to 120 personnel  
• 4 x light infantry battalions, each composed of up to 750 personnel and 70 
vehicles 
• Engineer unit of up to 505 personnel  
• Light signals unit of up to 135 personnel  
• Reconnaissance company (wheeled) of up to 150 personnel 
• Helicopter unit of up to 80 personnel, 10 vehicles and 4 helicopters 
• Military police unit of up to 48 personnel and 17 vehicles 
• Light multi-role logistical unit of up to 190 personnel and 40 vehicles 
• Level 2 medical unit of up to 35 personnel and 10 vehicles  
• Military observer group of up to 120 officers 
• Civilian support group consisting of logistical, administration and budget 
components (“Policy Framework,” 2005).  
4. Training and Doctrine  
As Maurer’s research on coalition command shows (1994),  
Effective execution requires that all functional elements such as 
operations, intelligence, logistics, communications, and other support 
activities, do their part and support the operational requirements. Each is 
important to the whole operations (pp. 84–85). 
EASBRIG is expected to act as one unit comprised of units from different 
militaries, with different values, technologies, languages and practices. These are 
expected to work together to accomplish the same mission. For this, there should be a 
common policy, doctrine, procedure, and training in order for there to be one command 
structure and as one contingent. 
 “A multifunctional peace operations capability for the ASF would require 
standardized doctrine and a clear concept of operations that are consistent with UN 
missions” (Cilliers and Malan, 2005). Therefore, for the future performance of the 
EASBRIG there should be a common standard for training, policies, doctrine, SOPs, 
command and control, information, evaluation, and logistics.  
 
21
Consistent with this, EASBRIG needs to develop and disseminate 
• The EASBRIG Standard Operational Procedures (SOPs) 
• Lesson learned 
• Sharing training experiences 
• Planning Element (PLANELM) instructions 
• Training Policies 
• Regional coordination enhanced through regional peacekeeping centers of 
excellence (Kenya) 
5. Readiness and Deployment 
Each country would undertake to keep its contribution at an agreed state of 
readiness. When fully established, the EASBRIG will consist of standby 
multidisciplinary contingents with civilian and military components located in their 
countries of origin and ready for rapid deployment in the sub-region and anywhere in 
Africa (or beyond) at appropriate notice.  
The ASF policy framework provides that missions deployed for Scenarios 
1–3 should be self-sustainable for up to 30 days, while Scenarios 4–6 
missions and operations should deploy with up to 90 days self-
sustainability. Thereafter the AU or UN must take responsibility for the 
sustainment of the missions or, if lacking that capacity, the readiness and 
ability of the AU to start reimbursing troop-contributing countries (TCCs) 
so that these countries can continue to sustain their contingents.  
Readiness to deploy within 14 days will require regular joint field 
exercises with all units, a standing fully staffed brigade headquarters, and 
support. It will also require an established and fully stocked logistics 
system capable of sustaining the entire brigade. 
At 30 days readiness, collective training will at least have to involve 
regular command post exercises. At this level of readiness, there is a clear 
requirement for at least a standing nucleus of a brigade headquarters with 
its attendant support as well as an established and fully stocked logistics 
system capable of sustaining the entire brigade. 
At 90 days readiness, there may be time to conduct preparatory training to 




For timely deployment of peace forces within the timelines for the various 
conflict scenarios, EASBRIG should have mission-ready units and headquarters. This 
readiness is to be confirmed via readiness of equipment, to include vehicles and 
communications. If the idea of inter-operability is to become a reality, there must also be 
a way to harmonize and standardize operational procedures, logistical systems and, for 
that matter, the whole concept of logistics. To ensure the readiness of EASBRIG, training 
should also become a major focus of peacekeeping training efforts.  
6. Command and Control 
In the “Memorandum of Understanding,” (2005) in article 5 it is stated that the 
organs of the EASBRIG are: 
a. The Assembly of Eastern Africa Heads of State and Government; 
b. The Eastern Africa Council of Ministers of Defense and Security; 
c. The Eastern Africa Committee of Chiefs of Defense Staff'; 
d. PLANELM (in Nairobi, Kenya); 
e. EASBRIG Headquarters; and (in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia) 
f. The Logistics Base (in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia). 
“All the EASBRIG missions shall be mandated by the Peace and Security Council 
(PSC) of the African Union” (“Policy Framework,” 2005). The Council of Ministers of 
IGAD with ministers from the other four non-IGAD states forms the organ that would 
take charge of operations at the political level. This organ assumes the responsibilities of 
a strategic headquarters that provides the strategic direction for peace support operations 
in the sub-region. “The functions of the Committee of East African Chiefs of Defense 
Staff are to serve as an advisory military committee for the Council of Ministers of 
Defense and Security and the assembly; and to oversee, direct and manage the 
PLANELM, EASBRIG headquarters and the logistics base” (Policy framework for the 
establishment of the EASBRIG). 
A Director, assisted by four Principal Officers, will head the Coordinating 
Mechanism for EASBRIG. The Mechanism will be co-located with the PLANELM in 
Nairobi, Kenya. The council also “requested the AU to accept and adopt the new 
EASBRIG Coordinating Mechanism as a permanent structure” (“EASBRIG 
Communiqué,” 2005). 
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EASBRIG has decided to have separate locations for the PLANELM and the 
brigade headquarters, with the brigade headquarters in Addis Ababa and the PLANELM 
in Nairobi. The decision to locate the logistics base in Ethiopia has the benefit of 
potentially co-locating with the AU logistics depot. The EASBRIG Headquarters in 
Addis Ababa will serve as a command headquarters for force preparation and operational 
command. 
There would be a standing headquarters, but no permanent standing force in 
place. With the designation of a crisis, the force commander would summon his troops 
from the contributing countries and go into action (Rotberg, 2000, p. 11). 
 
 
Figure 1.   Schematic Representation of EASBRIG Command and Control Structure 
(From Cilliers and Malan, 2005) 
 
 
B. EXPERIENCE OF OTHER AFRICAN SUB-REGIONAL PEACE FORCES 
Although it might be valuable to review peacekeeping practices throughout the 
world, the intention of this thesis is to focus only on African examples.  
1. Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group 
(ECOMOG) 
Sub-regional organizations started to emerge in the decade after independence to 
provide for closer cooperation between African countries. In West Africa, the Economic 
Community of West Africa States (ECOWAS), which is comprised of 16 independent  
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states, was formed in 1975 and was intended as the principal institutional mechanism and 
focus of West African diplomacy to foster cooperation and economic integration among 
member states (Benneh, et al, 1996, p. 1). 
Following the Liberian conflict at the beginning of 1990, 
ECOWAS states, concerned with the threat to regional stability posed by 
the conflict, and well aware of Western countries’ unwillingness to 
intervene, decided to set up an armed [Economic Community of West 
Africa States] Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) to restore law and order in 
Liberia, create the conditions for humanitarian aid to be delivered and 
allow for cease-fire negotiations (Faria, 2004). 
Apart from the Liberian conflict, ECOMOG has also intervened in Sierra Leone 
between 1995 and 2005 and in Guinea-Bissau in 1998-1999 with the intent to accept 
responsibility for stabilizing the situation in neighboring countries before it escalates and 
causes a crisis in their sub-region. 
Given that the lead state is likely to be the major state in a sub-region, Nigeria 
took the initiative, committed the necessary resources, accepted the inevitable costs, and 
put together the coalition (Rotberg, 2000). Even so, there were problems among the 
member states of ECOMOS during the initial stages, especially over fears about divisions 
between Anglophone and Francophone African, with concern over the rise of Nigeria as a 
political, economic, and military regional hegemon. However, over time Nigeria has 
shown the strongest determination to address and resolve conflict situations in the region.  
According to Rene (2002), “ECOMOG’s lack of experience, along with disarray 
in Lagos, intensified in many disastrous false starts in peacekeeping in Liberia” (p. xiv). 
Many shortcomings and political rivalries among its member states have created 
problems in the organizations. However, the organization was able to take action and 
demonstrate improvement over time, and thus enabled it to thereby reach its goals.  In the 
end, ECOMOG’s mission was relatively successful in ending the civil war and leading 
Liberia towards a relatively peaceful election in July 1997.  
In light of ECOMOG’s success and because it had no regular rapid reaction force 
ready for deployment as one unit, in May 2003 ECOWAS member states decided to 
create a rapid reaction military force that consisted of 6,500 soldiers to respond to 
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conflicts in the region (Faria, 2004), which effectively replaced ECOMOG with what is 
known as the ECOWAS Task Force (Panafrican News Agency, 2004). 
2. South Africa Development Cooperation (SADC) 
The Southern African Development Community (SADC) was created in 1992. 
The organization was created because of the conversion of the South African 
Development Cooperation Conference (SADCC) established in 1980, which was initially 
formed to reduce dependence on the apartheid regime in South Africa and support 
Namibia’s struggle for independence. After the peaceful resolution of South Africa’s 
apartheid problem, SADCC was refocused to create a regional common market and 
became the SADC in 1992. After 1994 when South Africa joined the organization and 
pointed to unresolved conflicts in Africa, member states decided to create the Organ on 
Politics, Defense and Security Cooperation. “However, the existence of defense and 
security structures within SADC has not proven to be very effective in boosting the 
SADC role in conflict management and resolution in the region” (Faria, 2004). Recently, 
a Mutual Defense Pact was signed at the SADC summit in 2003. At a meeting of SADC's 
Organ on Politics, Defense, and Security Cooperation in Pretoria in December 2004, 
SADC committed to creating a SADC standby brigade and gave the green light to its 
military chiefs to appoint a planning team to do so (Neethling, 2005). 
Some SADC members have been particularly engaged in peacekeeping 
and conflict mediation and resolution in the region and are among the 
most active in deploying multinational forces for peace initiatives in 
Africa. . . SADC has also regularly organized peacekeeping instructions 
and peacekeeping training exercises, which are playing an important role 
in developing standing operating procedures, involving both civilian and 
military components (Faria, 2004, p. 18). 
C. SOME LESSONS LEARNED BY AFRICAN PEACEKEEPING 
MISSIONS: LESSONS FOR EASBRIG 
Given lessons learned by ECOMOG and SADC, as well as its own sub-regional 
distinctions the author will now try to indicate some issues which need attention as 
EASBRIG is stood up. 
1. Neighboring States as a Source of Challenge 
Regional organizations are made up of countries both involved in a conflict and 
those that are not.  Neighboring states could be a contributing factor to conflicts in 
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countries, and thereby complicate issues for a regional organization. Also, regional 
organizations are made up of individual countries, some of which are large and influential 
within the sub-region. Each region in Africa has countries that are strong economically or 
militarily, which allow their governments to influence the initiatives that the regional 
organization promotes. In many cases, the leader of an influential state takes the initiative 
and secures the support of other member states of the region in order to launch a peace 
effort in the name of a given regional organization.  
Such a situation has its pros and cons. Influential states have the benefit of 
being relatively more able to make things happen. On the one hand, they 
can be perceived as pushing others around, [as] one can not speak 
ECOWAS without Nigeria or SADC without South Africa (Conflict 
Resolution in Africa, 2004). 
Initiatives brought by neighboring states, can be problematic in other ways. As 
they are geographically and therefore politically, economically and socially close to the 
conflict, one or the other party in a conflict may not see neighbors as fair arbiters. One 
sees this, for example, in the response to a decision made in 2005 by the brokers of the 
Somali peace process and approved on June 14, 2006 by the Somalia’s parliament that 
peacekeepers from Uganda and Sudan would enter Somalia first, followed by Kenya and 
Ethiopia. The reaction from the public and rival groups in the transitional government 
was negative. Many Somalis became suspicious of Ethiopia’s intentions and assumed that 
the Ethiopian Government supported the Somalia Transitional Government.  They held a 
demonstration to make the point that, “Somalis want to govern themselves ... we will 
never accept military intervention from Ethiopia” (Cawthorne, 2006). 
Yet in the case of Somalia, neighboring states could also play a significant role 
because when neighboring states play constructive roles they are indispensable to the 
resolution of conflicts.  
They represent a factor of stability and serve as the ‘example - next- door’ 
of the benefits of peace. As knowledgeable partners who are familiar with 
the personalities involved, language, with local cultures, and ethnicities 
neighbouring states can play a vital role in efforts to end conflicts 
(Conflict Resolution in Africa, 2004). 
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Of course, one would be naïve not to recognize that states may follow their 
political interests when they participate in the creation of regional peacekeeping or 
peacemaking forces and they may use ‘peacekeeping’ forces to further their more narrow 
geo-political objectives rather than the broader humanitarian objective (Rene, 2002, p. 9). 
2. Dependent on the International Community 
Financial constraints are becoming a big burden for the AU when it comes to 
tackling its security problems on the continent. AU experience is that even the relatively 
small and less logistically demanding unarmed military observer missions the OAU 
undertook were so costly that it was not able to finance them from its own budget.  
The OAU had to rely on donor funding to finance the relatively small 
missions it deployed to Rwanda (NMOG), Burundi (OMIB), the Comoros 
(OMIC), Ethiopia/Eritrea (OLMEE) and the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo (JMC) over the past decade. South Africa as the AMBI lead nation 
has spent approximately US $140 million, to sustain its troops and to 
supply most of the logistical needs (e.g. fuel, flights and medical 
requirements) of the mission (De Coning, 2005).  
Where budget and logistical issues are concerned, Africa recognizes its limited 
resource capacity and has always required outside assistance. The international 
community’s support thus remains crucial. The AU did a good job in its first operation, 
the African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB), but could not have succeeded in this very 
important endeavor without donor support. The UN is encouraging and empowering 
regional or sub-regional organizations to intervene militarily for peace in their own areas. 
Training and funding from wealthier countries ought to be made available to prepare for 
and sustain such regional or sub-regional intervention capability (Rotberg, 2000, p. 10). 
The U.S. contributed some $11 million to the AU's Burundi effort (Frazer, 2005). This 
support enabled Burundi’s operation to transition into a United Nations peacekeeping 
operation, which successfully paved the way for elections that have installed a new 
government and parliament.  
In Darfur, Sudan, the AU has taken the next big step by assuming the task of 
managing the deployment needed to seek peace in Darfur. The international community’s 
financial and logistics support for the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) is key to 
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its success. The United States has shown that it is such a partner by putting forward a 
major share of the funding needed to bring peace to Darfur, including providing over 
$160 million in funding to support the AU deployment in Darfur (Frazer, 2005). 
Moreover, cooperation between the United Nations and the AU in African 
peacekeeping should focus on enhancing and strengthening the institutional capability of 
the AU through mobilization and provision of financial, logistical, and technical support. 
To this end, it is strongly recommended that the UN member states, in particular those 
with the ability and resources to do so, contribute to the African capacity-building efforts 
in peacekeeping missions.  
When it comes to financing and logistical support, the fact of the matter is the AU 
and sub-regional organizations will likely continue to depend on the goodwill of leading 
nations and the international community. 
3. Lack of Creation of Rapid Response Capacity 
EASBRIG is expected to be a reliable part of the ASF system in which trained 
and equipped troops are available immediately after the AU Peace and Security Council's 
decision to mandate an operation to use this force.  
However, Member States can still decline to participate, which means that 
standby arrangements are somewhat like traveler's checks with only one 
signature: until the owner countersigns, the currency cannot be used. In 
practice, standby arrangements have not proven themselves to be enough 
to meet the challenge of rapid deployment (“UN vital peacekeeping 
data”). 
Therefore, EASBRIG could face the lack of response, which will cause delay in 
deployment. To overcome such a problem, ideally more forces than those required for a 
single brigade should be identified and prepared.  
In order to guarantee the EASBRIG’s deployment in any condition, even when 
some countries choose not to deploy as part of a particular operation, countries should 
prepare two- to three-fold of the forces needed for EASBRIG. This would demand a 
considerable commitment of troops from countries in the sub-region. One way to prepare 
reserve peace troops would be for every country to prepare more forces than it pledged to  
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contribute. The other option could be that there should be a prior agreement among the 
troop-contributing countries to prepare reserve forces within each country to overcome 
the problem when one or many countries refuse to participate in a particular mission.  
4. Problems of the Coalition Forces Training, Creation of Integrated 
Command 
Training of forces presents certain challenges. “It has been said that the 
EASBRIG is not to deploy as a collection of battalions that are unfamiliar with one 
another’s doctrine, leadership, and operational practices, even though the brigade would 
have to come from a group of countries” (Cilliers and Malan, 2005). For this purpose, the 
EASBRIG mechanism is developing common training principles, doctrine, equipment 
standards, and command and control arrangements for operational control of the forces. 
Differences in tactical doctrine among the West African troop-contributing countries 
(between Francophone and Anglophone countries) created an earlier crisis for 
ECOMOG. This example alone illustrates why there is a clear need for sub-regional and 
even regional harmonization and standardization of peacekeeping training. 
The second issue/challenge is the creation of an integrated command. In order to 
organize EASBRIG and engage in operations a good staffing system and integrated 
command structures are needed (Rene, 1993). Staff arrangement is minimal for military 
coordination measures adopted within an alliance. However, in some instances there may 
be a temptation for countries that have more military or expertise and economic power in 
the sub-region to monopolize the key posts and to contribute more. Such an approach 
should be avoided (Rotberg, 2000, p. 92). 
Since the command and control of the East African peacekeeping forces, in this 
case, is going to be rendered by the commander of EASBRIG and its staff, which will 
have the technical and formal capability of commanding and controlling, selecting the 
commander from which ever country is the most powerful is not a concern. It is clear that 
the assignment of the brigade’s commander is on a rotational basis. The brigade 
commander is expected to be trained and technically qualified. The other thing that 
should be clear in the command and control process is having a clear statement of 
intervention. When the brigade commander receives an order, how and through which 
channel is he going to disseminate the order to summon forces? Who gives him the order 
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and to whom does he report? What are the channels of passing and receiving information 
and advice? Clarity regarding the rules of engagement will depend on the mandate of the 
operation, especially at the time of intervention when there may be the need to use 
military force. Meanwhile no matter how clearly one can state all of this on paper, 
application in practice can be most problematic.  The execution of guidance and orders in 
the case of multinational forces is critical for the actual ability of the Brigade Commander 
to command and control his assigned forces for the accomplishment of the mission. 
Therefore, for EASBRIG to succeed in having an integrated command structure, 
it will require the Eastern African countries’ mutual commitment to the region’s peace 
and security. When the author says integration of command structure, this depends on the 
power of the commander in the execution of his orders and how effective and efficient 
his organization is. In the case of coalition forces, it is obvious that there may be 
limitations in the execution of the commander’s authority. In this case, however, 
problems can be anticipated and questions addressed ahead of time, as Rotberg, (2000) 
indicates: 
Do component unit commanders themselves have authority to respond 
immediately on an order from the force commander, or do they need to 
consult with their own national political leaders? Within their assigned 
areas of responsibility, do the component units follow similar patterns of 
operation, or will they routinely operate in different ways? The ideal is 
clear authority by the force commander and common doctrine, tactics, and 
procedure (pp.159-160). 
Of course when a situation is complicated and unpredictable, situations arise the 
unit commander may not be able to apply all of these procedures. As has happened in 
many previous peacekeeping missions when the commander gives an order, some units 
may respond with, “Well, that sounds like a reasonable instruction; we’ll think about it 
and get back to you;” others with, “We’ll check with the president;” and others with, 
“That sounds interesting, but we see things differently” (Rotberg, 2000, p. 160).  In such 
a situation, the commander may be relegated to the role of coordinator instead of being 
the actual commander. 
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Also critical is the development and introduction of common standards of 
operations to facilitate the joint training among force-contributing states’ armies. With 
this is a need to develop a common pool of logistical, communication and transportation 
equipment to be used in peacekeeping operations in the sub-region.  This too, needs to be 
coordinated and monitored by the command element. 
5. Combined Training: Solution to Improve EASBRIG Interoperability 
 The ability of combined forces to operate together effectively has been 
increasingly valued in peace operations during the author's era, and yet there are also 
increasing challenges. According to Fitz-Gerald, (2003), “Multinational military 
interventions that promote sustainable and enduring peace building measures have 
become increasingly challenged due to the complex environments and the many different 
players that are brought into these theaters.”  
EASBRIG in its future deployment is expected to operate as a single unit and 
have effective interoperability. Troops coming from different countries, to realize this 
interoperability, should pass through joint exercises, which should enable them to 
maneuver and operate as one unit in future peacekeeping or peace enforcement 
operations. In this regard, EASBRIG has many things to learn from the experience of 
ECOWAS:  
From a military standpoint, the ECOMOG operation in Liberia started off 
inauspiciously, beset by problems with military equipment, logistics, 
training and interoperability, and aggravated by language 
differences……..Some of these problems persisted: eight years into the 
operation, ECOMOG commander General Shelpidi identified "... 
differences in language, training, equipment and orientation" as key 
issues in interoperability within ECOMOG, stressing the need for 
bilingual language training in the region, as well as joint training and 
standardisation of equipment (Hutchful, 1999). 
Learning from ECOMOG’s experiences, and in order to carry out future peace 
operations in a successful manner, EASBRIG must anticipate certain problems that may 
preclude the effectiveness of the brigade. These problems can be eliminated by 
conducting planned and organized combined training of the commanders and staffs, and 
via whole unit exercises prior to deployment whenever the situation permits. This may 
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include pre-mission preparation of commanders at all levels, familiarizing them with the 
doctrine and procedures to be used in the mission. 
 To create the interoperability capability of different units coming from different 
countries, forces should be trained in their respective countries based on the common 
training materials prepared for EASBRIG troop preparation. Although individual 
contingents assume that they maintain decisive unilateral efficiency and strength, these 
individual units are expected to work in concert with other contingents to act as one unit 
for one mission objective. Thus, the quest for the most effective methods for integrating 
and improving interoperability of different contingents through joint training should be a 
major focus of EASBRIG. Moreover, this joint training could also enable integration of 









IV. ETHIOPIAN PEACE FORCES’ PAST AND PRESENT 
PRACTICES 
A. COUNTRY PROFILE 
Ethiopia is the third most populated African country after Nigeria and Egypt, with 
an estimated 72 million inhabitants. Ethiopia is one of the oldest countries in the world 
and the oldest independent country in Africa, credited with being the birthplace of human 
beings5, as well as the original home of coffee. Ethiopia maintained its independence not 
because colonialists did not want the country, but only through the heroic acts of its 
population who defeated foreign invaders throughout its history, such as Egypt, the 
Mahadi6, Ottoman Turks, and Italy (1896 and 1935–1941). History verifies that the 
Ethiopian ancestors for many centuries struggled to stabilize the country’s boundaries 
and to maintain the nation’s freedom. For these reasons Ethiopia is well known as “the 
Land of Free Men” (Skordiles, 1954, p. 10). 
Ethiopia was admitted into the League of Nations in 1923. Ethiopia was a charter 
member of the United Nations. Since World War II, it has played an active role in world 
and African affairs.  “The emergence meanwhile of a succession of independent African 
states, in the late 1950s and early 1960s, enabled the Ethiopian Government, speaking 
with an authority based on the country's unique history of independence, to involve itself 
increasingly in the continent's affairs” (Pankhurst, 1997). As one of only two African 
states that never permanently colonized (the other is Liberia), Ethiopia used its long 
diplomatic tradition to support the independence of African countries and of unity. On 
top of this, “Ethiopia's military and diplomatic relationship with the United States 
provided it with a superpower ally. . . Haile Selassie took the lead in pressing for a 
                                                 
5 According to working paper sites of political science Country Biography Index. Retrieved on Aug 14, 2006 
from, http://workingpapers.org/country/ethiopia.htm. 
6 The Mahdiyah has become known as the first genuine Sudanese nationalist government. The Mahdiyah 
(Mahdist regime) imposed traditional Islamic laws. Regional relations remained tense throughout much of the 
Mahdiyah period, largely because of the Khalifa's commitment to using the jihad to extend his version of Islam 
throughout the world. For example, the Khalifa rejected an offer of an alliance against the Europeans by Emperor 
Yohannes IV of Ethiopia. In 1887, a 60,000-man Ansar army invaded Ethiopia, penetrated as far as Gondar, and 
captured prisoners and booty. The Khalifa then refused to conclude peace with Ethiopia. In March 1889, an Ethiopian 




resolution establishing the territorial integrity of the independent states of Africa” 
(Pankhurst, 1997). The emperor, Haile Selassie, with other famous leaders of newly 
independent African countries succeeded in forming the OAU. Because of Ethiopia’s 
contribution in forming the OAU and its significance as symbol of independence in 
Africa, the leaders of the OAU member states agreed that the HQ of the organization 
should be in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Subsequently, the United Nation's Economic 
Commission for Africa (ECA) was also located in Ethiopia. 
B. ETHIOPIA’S COMMITMENT TO THE UN COLLECTIVE SECURITY 
MISSIONS 
Ethiopia was the only African nation to single-handedly fight for the promotion of 
the principle of collective peace and security by challenging the European powers in the 
days of the League of Nations. Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt confirmed this in an address7 
on December 1, 1951, at the ceremony honoring representatives of UN Forces in Korea:  
Years ago, a man speaking for a very small country, stood before the 
League of Nations pleading for collective action against aggression. 
Representatives of his country stand among the men and forces we are 
honoring today. And I should like to repeat to you the words he spoke 
when he bade farewell to his forces when they sailed to Korea last April. I 
repeat them because I believe this new declaration is as prophetic as the 
earlier plea that went unheeded. These are words of Emperor Haile 
Selassie of Ethiopia: 
You are departing on a long crusade in defense of that very principle for 
which we have fought - freedom, and respect for the freedom of others. 
With such traditions and after such sacrifices, Ethiopia would be the first 
nation to recognize the imperative urgency of that call of duty toward a 
sister nation. 
It is in yet a large sense, Soldier that you are today leaving the Homeland 
to fight on distant shores. [You are fighting not only for freedom, as we 
know it in Ethiopia, and the right of each people to its freedom.] You are 
also representing and defending in far corners of the earth, the most sacred 
principle of modern international policy - that principle of collective 
security with which the name of Ethiopia is imperishably associated 
(Skordiles, 1954, p. 243). 
                                                 
7 After the President's death in 1945 she returned to a cottage at his Hyde Park estate; she told reporters: "the 
story is over." Within a year, however, she began her service as American spokesman in the United Nations. She 
continued a vigorous career until her strength began to wane in 1962. She died in New York City that November, and 
was buried at Hyde Park beside her husband.  
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1. Background for Ethiopian Participation in Peace Operations 
Why has Ethiopia always positively responded to the calls of the UN for troop 
contributions? Legally, due to the 1936 failure of the League of Nations to react to the 
Italian invasion of Ethiopia, the Ethiopian Government has been inspired to participate in 
the collective security efforts of the UN. Because Ethiopia was the victim of the 
collective security concept of the League of Nations, it did not want the same thing to 
happen to any other country of the world under the UN. Skordiles, in his book Kagnew, 
writes,  
No other nation understood the true meaning of the war in Korea as did 
the Ethiopians.  . . . The idea of collective security is very closely 
connected with Ethiopia. This nation lost her independence for five years, 
because of the lack of collective security. This lack indirectly caused the 
Second World War (Skordiles, 1954). 
Initially, the League made some positive moves. However, in regards to the 1931 
Japanese aggression in China and the 1935 Italian aggression in Ethiopia, the League was 
unable to translate its principles of collective security into action. The principle 
demanded that member states participate in collective actions to prevent acts of 
aggression. In 1936, when Italy invaded Ethiopia with the determination to avenge the 
defeat at Adwa (1896) and to establish an Italian empire, the Emperor appealed to the 
League of Nations to act appropriately against Italy. In his appeal the Emperor said, 
I had placed all my hopes in the execution of these undertakings. My 
confidence had been confirmed by the repeated declarations made in the 
Council to the effect that aggression must not be rewarded, and that force 
would end by being compelled to bow before right…. On behalf of the 
Ethiopian people, a member of the League of Nations, I request the 
Assembly to take all measures proper to ensure respect for the Covenant. I 
renew my protest against the violations of treaties of which the Ethiopian 
people has been the victim. I declare in the face of the whole world that 
the Emperor, the Government and the people of Ethiopia will not bow 
before force; that they maintain their claims that they will use all means in 
their power to ensure the triumph of right and the respect of the Covenant. 
… The great Powers who have promised the guarantee of collective 
security to small States on whom weighs the threat that they may one day 
suffer the fate of Ethiopia , I ask what measures do you intend to take? 
(Haile Selassie I, 1936). 
However, the international community’s reply was silence.  
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After the defeat of the Italian invader in 1941, Haile Selassie started to transform 
Ethiopia into a centralized monarchical state. The creation of a strong national army was 
an important part of that transformation and required abandonment of the traditional 
method of raising armies by provincial levies. In 1942, the emperor signed a military 
convention with the British Government, whereby Britain agreed to provide a military 
mission to assist in organizing and training the Ethiopian army. The Ethiopian 
Government expended about 40% of its annual budget on defense and internal security 
for the creation of a regular army (“Military Traditions”). 
Haile Selassie also diversified his sources of foreign military assistance. Over 
several years, he appointed Swedish officers to train Ethiopia's Air Force, asked 
Norwegian naval personnel to organize and develop a small coastal navy, signed a 
military assistance agreement with the United States, invited Israeli advisers to train 
paratroopers and counterinsurgency units, and arranged for an Indian Military Mission to 
staff the faculty of the Harar Military Academy. During this period, a number of 
Ethiopian officers attended military schools in the United States, Britain, and Yugoslavia 
(“Military Traditions”). 
After their modernization, Ethiopia's security forces saw action in several foreign 
conflicts. The commitment was made to fulfill Ethiopia’s commitment to the UN. 
In spite of its harsh experience with the League of Nations, Ethiopia once 
again proved its commitment to global peace and security by being one of 
three founding African nations of the UN The positive responses it gave 
on a number of occasions when requested to contribute troops to be 
deployed in peacekeeping missions in troubled spots of the world are 
rooted in the country’s respect to international law and firm stand to the 
principle of collective peace and security (“Military Traditions”). 
The Ethiopian troop contribution to the UN upon the outbreak of the Korean War 
in June 1950 and consecutively for the Congo in 1960 and in Rwanda, Burundi, and 
Liberia (see Appendix A) depicted its commitment to UN peace and collective security. 
According to the United Nations’ monthly summary dated January 30, 2006, Ethiopia is 
the sixth largest contributor of military troops to the UN, as it deploys 3,412 














Figure 2.   Ethiopian Past and Present UN Missions 
(After: World Map) 
 
2. Ethiopia’s First International Mission in Korea, United Nations 
Command Korea (UNCK) (1951–1956)  
Ethiopia has a long and proud history in United Nations peace support operations, 
and has participated and is participating in five UN missions since 1950. The United 
Nations mission in Korea (1951–1956) was the first international collective security 
mission by Ethiopia. This mission was established under the United Nations Security 
Council Resolution of 7 July 1950.  
Ethiopia responded to the mission for two reasons: The first was, while 
Ethiopia was speaking against invasion in the League of Nations, no 
country was supporting and the Ethiopian government knew exactly what 
it feels to be helpless and it did not want that to happen to other countries 
again. The other reason was the Ethiopian government was showing its 
loyalty and commitment to the United Nations (Ethiopian MOD, 2006). 
On June 25, 1950, North Korean forces attacked South Korea without warning. 
The Republic of Korea Army forces were forced to retreat toward their capital of Seoul. 
Two days later, the United Nations Security Council called on the countries of the world 
and passed a resolution to drive the invader from the Republic of Korea (ROK). In its 
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resolution, the UN Security Council assigned the United States as executive agent to 
implement the resolution and direct UN military operations in Korea. Following that, on 
July 24, in Tokyo, General MacArthur of the U.S. established General Headquarters, 
United Nations Command. “First, the U.S. troops started to deploy on June 25 then on 
August 29, 1950, the British Commonwealth's troops arrived” (Korean War). Troop units 
from other countries of the UN followed in rapid succession. 
On April 13, 1951, the Ethiopian expeditionary force to Korea departed from 
Addis Ababa and arrived in Korea in May 1951 and was attached to the 32nd Regiment of 
the U.S. 7th Infantry Division in June 1951 (Varhola, 2000). It held the crest line of a 
great ridge on the right flank of the 7th Infantry Division of the United States along the 
Eighth Army's main resistance line and fought with distinction (“Military Traditions”). 
Colonel Kebede Gebre was the Commanding officer of the Ethiopian Expeditionary force 
and later became Lt. Gen and the Minister of Ethiopian National Defense. Thereafter, 
Ethiopia sent a fresh ‘Kagnew’ Battalion every twelve months for a continuous period of 
five years, up to August 7, 1956. Ethiopia deployed 341 officers and 5,696 NCOs, which 
totaled 6,037 troops in those five successive assignments (see Appendix A). Each 
battalion had 1,200 troops under UN Command. The first three battalions were engaged 
in 253 major and minor battles during the first three years (1951-1953) (Ethiopia MOD, 
1962). The other two battalions were sent after the cease-fire agreement was signed. As 
one veteran recently remarked, “We observe that through the past 55 years the history 
made by the Kagnew Battalion is getting wider recognition from time to time” (Emlaelu 
Worede, 2006). 
Many writers witnessed the Ethiopian contingent’s heroic participation in the 
Korean War.  Excerpts from the book, Pork Chop Hill, written by S.L. A. Marshall in 
1953 right after the cease-fire agreement between the UN forces and North Korea, 
describe the quality of the Ethiopian fighters of that time. 
Of all troops which fought in Korea, the Ethiopians stood highest in the 
quality of their officer-man relationships, the evenness of their 
performance under fire and the mastery of techniques by which they 
achieved near perfect unity of action in adapting themselves to new 
weapons during training and in using them to kill efficiently in battle. 
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They could not read maps but they never missed a trail. 
Out of dark Africa came these men, thin, keen eyed, agile of mind and 95 
per cent illiterate. They could take over U. S. Signal Corps equipment and 
in combat make it work twice as well as the best-trained American troops. 
When they engaged, higher headquarters invariably knew exactly what 
they were doing. The information, which they fed back, by wire and radio 
was far greater in volume and much more accurate than anything coming 
from American actions… 
If to our side, at the end as in the beginning, they were the Unknown 
Battalion, to the Communists they were a still greater mystery. When the 
final shot was fired, one significant mark stood to their eternal credit. Of 
all national groups fighting in Korea, the Ethiopians alone could boast that 
they had never lost a prisoner or left a dead comrade on the battlefield. 
Every wounded man, every shattered body, had been returned to the 
friendly fold.   
That uniquely clean sheet was not an accident of numbers only. Knowing 
how to gamble with death, they treated it lightly as a flower. On night 
patrol, as he crossed the valley and prowled toward the enemy works, the 
Ethiopian soldier knew that his chance of death was compounded. It was 
standing procedure in the battalion that if a patrol became surrounded 
beyond possibility of extrication, the supporting artillery would be ordered 
to destroy the patrol to the last man. 
That terrible alternative was never realized. Many times enveloped, the 
Ethiopian patrols always succeeded in breaking the fire ring and returning 
to home base. If there were dead or wounded to be carried, the officer or 
NCO leader was the first to volunteer. When fog threatened to diffuse a 
patrol, [they] moved hand in hand, like children. Even so, though they 
deny it, these Africans are cat-eyed men with an especial affinity for 
moving and fighting in the dark. In most of the races of man, superstition 
unfolds with the night, tricking the imagination and stifling courage. It is 
not so with the Ethiopians. The dark holds no extra terror. It is their 
element.  
Of this in part came the marked superiority in night operations which 
transfixed the Chinese. It hexed them as if they were fighting the 
superhuman. The Ethiopian left no tracks shed no blood and spoke always  
in an unknown tongue. Lack of bodily proof that he was mortal made him 




Of the many heroic acts of the Ethiopian troops described in Pork Chop Hill, the 
one that most attracted the author’s attention was known as “The Alligator Jaw:” 
In the Alligator Jaw’s mission, Wongele Costa and his twenty men were 
having their first experience under fire. At the end of the mission, 
Wongele Costa reported the number of twenty-two, they had counted 
enemy dead in their foreground. Two badly shot-up prisoners had been 
taken. For Wengele Costa and his men this was the first patrol sent from 
the newly arrived Ethiopian battalion which had come to Korea boasting 
that it would outshine the old Kagnew Battalion, which was a shining 
outfit (Marshall, 1953, pp. 201–211). 
Reading about Wongele Costa’s heroism and leadership in Pork Chop Hill 
inspired the author to interview him on a research trip to Ethiopia. The author has known 
Wongele Costa since his cadet training in 1977 when the training was transferred from 
Harar Military Academy to Holeta Military School because of the Ethio-Somalia War in 
the eastern part of Ethiopia. Wongele Costa was the training head of the Holeta Military 
School while the author was there as a cadet. Currently Wongele Costa has retired from 
the Ethiopian Army, which he did with the rank of Lt. Col in 1991. The author 
interviewed him and held discussions about the Kagnew Battalions’ military activities in 
Korea, and particularly about the Alligator Jaw’s patrol which was led by him as a 
platoon leader. Wongele said that he is very proud of his participation in the Korean War 
to uphold the principle of UN collective security. He remembered that he was nominated 
to be deployed with the 2nd Kagnew Battalion. However, after he prepared his platoon for 
the deployment, he was ordered to hand over his platoon to another officer. He was then 
deployed with the 3rd Kagnew Battalion, almost at the final moment of the battalion’s 
deployment, and with a platoon that another officer had prepared. At that time, Wongele 
was 19 years old and a fresh lieutenant who graduated in the 2nd course from the Military 
Academy of the Imperial Bodyguard. Concerning the patrol named the Alligator Jaw, as 
reported in Pork Chop Hill, it was his first mission. All efforts were made to prove that 
his 3rd Kagnew Battalion was no less effective than the previous Kagnew battalions were.  
He remembered that he felt very proud that he was the leader of the patrol, in which his 
men and he did such a good job. Because of his remarkable leadership, he was 
recognized as an excellent fighting officer and decorated with the Distinguished Military 
Medal of Haile Selassie I by Maj Gen Mulugeta Buli, Commander of the Division of the 
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Imperial Bodyguard, during his visit to Korea in May 1953. He was also awarded The 
Order of Military Merit, Wharang with Gold Star, from the Ministry of National Defense 
Republic of Korea.  
“The Incredible Patrol” is another patrol in which Ethiopians exhibited 
considerable heroism. Here it is not the author’s intention to present all the heroic acts 
engaged in by Ethiopians in the Korean War, but to just mention two of the best known 
among the 235 engagements of Ethiopian troops during the three years of war.   
There were fifteen men in the Incredible Patrol under the command of 27-
year-old 2nd Lieut. Zeneke Asfaw. Lieutenant Asfaw's mission on the 
night of 19 May [1953 was to] ambush a Chinese patrol and return with 
prisoners. On the ground within 150 yards of the ditch he had counted 73 
dead Chinese. On the slopes of Yoke and within the trenches were 37 
more enemy bodies. There were other bodies among the paddies forward 
of Uncle, still not counted. But assuming the usual battle ratio of four men 
wounded for every one mortally hit, the score said that he had effectively 
eliminated one Chinese battalion (Marshall, 1993, pp. 233–249). 
During the three years of the Korean War, Ethiopian troops fought and died 
together as members of the UNC. Casualties numbered 120 killed and 536 wounded. No 
one was captured (Skordiles, 1954, p. viii). 
Various government leaders and military commanders commended Ethiopia’s 
participation and heroic performance in the Korean War, undertaken on behalf of the 
principle of collective security at the time.   
It was gratifying to note that all the three battalions and their commanders 
enjoyed [a] high degree of respect and appreciate [ion] from the Force 
Commander for their efficiency and discipline. Moreover, the successful 
contingents received a number of decorations and awards from the South 
Korean government and several other countries. A memorial statue was 
also erected in honor of those who lost their dear lives in the line of duty 
(Ethiopian MOD, Indoctrinations and Public Relations Center, 2004). 
 
One reason Ethiopia’s participation in the Korean War deserves attention is that it 
is important for current and future members of the Armed Forces to recognize Ethiopia’s 
legacy in peacekeeping missions since it was there at the outset. Recognition of its 
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participation is also important in the sub-region, in the continent and in the world, 
particularly as Ethiopia strives to be a force for stabilization. 
3. Ethiopian Participation in United Nations Operation in the Congo 
(ONUC) (July 1960–June 1964) 
The Republic of Congo, a former Belgian colony, became independent on June 
30, 1960. In the days that followed, disorder broke out, and Belgium sent its troops to the 
Congo without the agreement of the Congolese Government, declaring that they were 
there to restore law and order and protect Belgian nationals  (Republic of Congo- ONUC 
Background, 1960). On July 12, 1960, the Congolese Government called for the United 
Nations to intervene to repel the aggression. Accordingly, the UN Security Counsel 
passed Resolution Number 143 on July 14, 1960 (Republic of Congo- ONUC Mandate, 
1960), by which it decided to authorize the Secretary-General to take the necessary steps. 
The initial mandate of ONUC was to ensure the withdrawal of Belgian forces 
from the Republic of the Congo, to assist the government in maintaining law and order, 
and to provide technical assistance.  
The function of ONUC was subsequently modified to include maintaining 
the territorial integrity and political independence of the Congo, 
preventing the occurrence of civil war and securing the removal from the 
Congo of all foreign military, paramilitary, and advisory personnel not 
under the United Nations Command, and all mercenaries (Republic of 
Congo—ONUC Mandate, 1960). 
Under this mandate, thirty countries, which included Ethiopia, gave their positive 
reply to defend the principle of collective security and contributed about 19,820 soldiers 
in total (Republic of Congo- ONUC Mandate, 1960). 
The UN Security Council asked for troops from Ethiopia, Tunisia, and Morocco. 
Ethiopia, being a strong supporter of the UN principle of Collective Security, gave its 
positive reply immediately. The Ethiopian Government, who understood the urgency of 
deploying peace troops to Congo, deployed its first battalion on July 17, 1960 within 48 
hours of giving its consent to the UN. The Ethiopian Government did not wait until the 
UN arranged transportation for the Ethiopian Battalion. The Ethiopian Air Force and 
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Ethiopian Air Lines transported the first battalion, led by Lt. Col Seyoum Gedlegiorgis.8 
This fast preparation and transportation of troops by the Ethiopian Government allowed 
deploying troops to reach their mission area just 48 hours after the UN decision of the 
Security Council to send peacekeeping troops to Congo.9 
Ethiopia participated in ONUC and deployed four Tekil Brigades from 1960–
1963 (see Appendix 1) with the aim of maintaining law and order in Congo. Over the 
length of the mission, Ethiopia sent some 3,000 military personnel in four Brigades and 
six F-86 Sabre Fighters from the Ethiopian Air Force (“Cambberas in the Congo”).  On a 
different mission “In 1967 four Ethiopian Air Force F-86 fighter-bombers were deployed 
to Zaire to help dislodge a concentration of European mercenaries fighting there on 
behalf of secessionists in Katanga Province (present-day Shaba Region)”  (“Military 
Traditions”). 
Moreover, Ethiopia is proud that the third among five force commanders of the 
UNOC was an Ethiopian, namely Lt. Gen Kebede Gebre who served from April 1962 to 
July 1963 (Republic of Congo—ONUC Mandate, 1960). He had personally commanded 
the Ethiopian Expeditionary Force in Korea when he was a Colonel from 1951-1953. 
C. THE DISRUPTION BETWEEN THE CONGO MISSION AND THE POST-
DERG RETURN TO PEACEKEEPING 
Since the founding of the UN, Ethiopia’s commitment was highly professional 
and promising. This had been proved by Ethiopia’s participation in the Korean War, 
1951-1953 and the Congo Peace Mission, 1961–1964. However, this commitment seems 
to have been interrupted for about 30 years, from 1964 to 1993. What led to such a long 
hiatus? 
During the Haile Selassie regime prior to 1964, Ethiopia’s internal situation was 
relatively calm and peaceful. However, once the decision was made to incorporate Eritrea 
as a province of Ethiopia, a separatist movement in Eritrea arose. Beginning in 1961, the 
Eritrean separatists turned to armed struggle and, by 1966, started challenging 
government forces throughout Eritrea. Also in 1960, following the independence of 
                                                 
8 This is based on the author's translation from the Amharic report on the performance of the first Tekil 
battalion  in Congo, 1960. 
9 Ibid. 
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Somalia, the demand for the creation of a greater Somalia began to gather support. 
Confrontations escalated in 1964 following incidents that occurred between Ethiopian 
and Somalia forces along the border.  From the late 1960s to 1974, Haile Selassie also 
faced demands for land reform, and for economic and political reforms. 
After 1974, in the years following Haile Selassie’s downfall and the establishment 
of the Derg Regime, several internal and external threats prevented the Derg from 
actively participating in regional and sub-regional political activities. In February 1977, 
as Mengistu’s regime attempted to consolidate its rule, the Somalia Government took 
advantage of the Derg's political problems, as well as its troubles in Eritrea, and attacked 
government positions throughout the Ogaden, initially by providing supplies and 
logistical support to the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF).  After 1974 and until 
its demise, the Derg regime was mainly engaged in fighting insurgencies that appeared in 
various parts of the country, namely in Eritrea, Tigray, and Oromo areas (with Oromo 
Liberation Front, (OLF)). 
In general, starting from the late 1960s until the demise of the Derg in 1991, 
Ethiopia’s leaders were mostly engaged in solving their internal problems using military 
forces. What becomes clear from this perspective is that Ethiopia’s participation in UN 
peace operations was interrupted from 1967–1991 because its military was being used to 
deal with internal problems. On the other hand, based on UN peacekeeping statistics, one 
can argue that since 1948 there have been a total of 60 UN peacekeeping operations, 47 
since 1988. Indeed there were no new UN peace missions anywhere in the world from 
1967–1974. This period was known as the ‘dormant period’, and coincided with the last 





Sq No. UN Peacekeeping Missions Duration 
1 India/Pakistan Sept. 1965-March 1967 
2 Angola Dec. 1988-May 1991 
3 Iran/Iraq Aug. 1988-Feb. 1991 
4 Afghan/Pakistan May 1988-March 1990 
5 Namibia April 1989-March 1990 
 
 
Table 1. UN Peacekeeping Missions Stated Within 1964-1990 




One can argue then, that despite its internal problems, had there been a need for 
sending Ethiopian troops, Haile Selassie’s regime could have contributed troops to the 
UN.  
Even during the Derg Regime, according to UN data, there were no peacekeeping 
missions from 1974 to 1988. There were only four UN peace missions, with two of them 
in Africa which started in 1988–1989.   Based on this, it is possible to conclude that the 
30-year interval from 1964 to 1993 in which Ethiopia did not participate in peace 
operations is largely the consequence of there being no peacekeeping missions and/or 
there were only a few peace operations that took place under UN auspices. Ethiopia’s 
engagement in its internal matters did not necessarily preclude the country from 
participating in UN peacekeeping operations. The main reason for the interval instead 
seems that there was no extreme demand that required Ethiopia to offer its forces. 
D. ETHIOPIA’S COMMITMENT TO UN PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS 
The Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), which led the 
Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE) in overthrowing the Derg regime in 1991, 
after 17 years of war was strongly convinced that for a state’s economic and social 
development, there should be constant peace and security inside and around the country. 
Peace in Ethiopia alone was not considered to be enough for the development of the 
country. Over time it has become increasingly obvious that it's not only the stability of 
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neighboring states, but also regional security disturbances, directly or indirectly, that 
affect the process of development in Ethiopia. In line with this commitment, the 
Ethiopian Government sent its peacekeepers to Rwanda when genocide occurred there in 
1994. This represented a strong reaffirmation after a 30-year interruption of the 
significantly accorded UN peace operations. It should be noted that this decision was 
made shortly after the overthrow of the Mengistu regime, when the Ethiopian 
Transitional Government was still in power and even before the creation of the formal 
Ethiopian Defense Force. This was noticed by the then-UNAMIR commander, Canadian 
Gen. Romeo Dallaire. “The Ethiopians were at the other extreme of preparedness. They 
had just finished a protracted civil war, and the reconnaissance party, which included the 
chief of staff of the Ethiopian army, was clearly ill at ease in brand new uniforms” 
(Dallaire, 2004, p. 444). 
1. Ethiopian Participation in United Nations Assistance Mission in 
Rwanda (UNAMIR) 1994–1995 
The United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) (October 1993–
March 1996) was established under the United Nations Security Council Resolution 940 
(1994) with the aim to contribute to the security and protection of displaced persons, 
refugees and civilians at risk in Rwanda; to provide security and support for the 
distribution of relief supplies and humanitarian relief; and to take action in self-defense 
against persons or groups threatening protected sites and populations, UN and other 
humanitarian personnel. Ethiopia participated in UNAMIR from August 1994 to July 
1995 and provided a battalion size unit for two rounds (see Appendix A). 
Rwanda, as a nation, began to feel relief soon after the Guna Battalion (the first 
Ethiopian contingent) led by Col. Tdale Gebre Sellassie arrived in the country.10 
However, Rwanda was a very tough assignment and materialized at a time when 
emotions were still simmering rather that cooling. “In the Rwanda Peace Mission the 
Ethiopian contingent was able to win the hearts of both the Hutu and Tutsi not through 
coercion but love and passion” (Best Practices News Letter 9). In witnessing this, Gen. 
Romeo Dallaire (2004) said,  
 
                                                 
10 The name of the first Ethiopian contingent to UNAMIR. 
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These soldiers [the Ethiopian troops] were incredibly resourceful. I once 
watched them use only long wooden switches to restrain a crowd that was 
trying to surge across the bridge at Cyangugu into Zaire. The switches 
were the kind that might have been used to herd cattle. The soldiers also 
had no compunction about getting into the fields to help local farmers 
harvest the rarely planted fields (p. 444). 
The people of Rwanda demonstrated confidence in the Ethiopian peacekeeping 
force as exemplified by the immediate halting of the exodus to Zaire. The troops 
participated in the settlement of 50,000 returnees. Not only was the mission for 
Ethiopians to keep the peace, but also owed to their disciplined impartiality, the troops 
were also involved in the reconstruction of Rwanda to make it economically viable. 
Rwanda above was all a successful mission that proved beyond doubt that Africans can 
effectively help solve their own problems with the financial and logistical support from 
the West (Ethiopian MOD, Indoctrinations and Public Relations Center, 2004). 
Since the creation of the Ethiopian Defense Force, Ethiopia’s participation in 
peacekeeping has become one of the defense force’s missions. Because of this, Ethiopian 
soldiers have also been deployed in Liberia and Burundi on UN missions.  
2. Ethiopian Participation in the United Nations Operation in Burundi 
(ONUB), 2003–to Date  
The Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi was agreed on in a 
transitional arrangement, which provided for the establishment of a transitional 
government in November 2001.  Although the transfer of power was a major goal for the 
full implementation of the Arusha Agreement, continued outbreaks of fighting indicated 
that the peace process in Burundi remained fragile.  
The 2002 (October 7, 2002 and December 2, 2002) ceasefire agreements between 
the government and rebel forces called for the deployment of an international 
peacekeeping force and the establishment of a Joint Ceasefire Commission to assist the 
parties in their implementation. On April 2nd, the Central Organ of the AU Mechanism 
for Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution mandated the deployment of troops 
from Ethiopia, Mozambique, and South Africa. Ethiopia, without hesitation, accepted the  
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invitation to contribute troops to the African mission in Burundi. Brigadier General 
Gebrat Ayele from Ethiopia was assigned as Deputy Commander of Burundi's 
Peacekeeping Force. 
Ethiopia sent a peacekeeping battalion to help realize the peace efforts in that 
country affected by a lengthy civil war (see Appendix A). Sending off the 1,000 strong 
force, Prime Minister Meles Zenawi said he was convinced that the force would carry out 
its mission to maintain peace and stability in Burundi.  He also affirmed Ethiopia’s 
commitment to pay the sacrifices necessary to discharge the mission as entrusted to it by 
the AU (Embassy of Ethiopia Washington D.C.). As P.M. Meles Zenawi put it, the 
commitment and sense of mission of the Ethiopian Peacekeeping Contingent in Burundi 
is a source of pride to the peoples and government of Ethiopia (ENA, 2004). 
Prior to their departure, members of the forces had received substantial training, 
which included the lessons learned from previous Ethiopian missions that might help 
with the maintenance of peace and security in Burundi.  To discharge its mission the 
Commander of the battalion, Lt. Colonel Meley Amare, said that the Ethiopian 
Peacekeeping Contingent had been sufficiently informed about the objective situation in 
Burundi, and had received training necessary for peacekeeping operations (Political 
Ethiopia News items, 2003, September). 
In October, all 3,000 troops (from Ethiopia, Mozambique, and South Africa) 
committed to the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB) were deployed. The Ethiopian 
Peacekeeping Contingent discharged the mission of disarmament and provided protection 
to military observers. The Ethiopian contingent worked in coordination with the 
peacekeeping contingents from Mozambique and South Africa. The Ethiopian 
Peacekeeping Contingent in Burundi performed its mission efficiently. 
While in the mission, the contingent repeated the Rwanda feat by 
involving itself in humanitarian and development activities apart from its 
peacekeeping duties. It has left so indelible an imprint in the hearts of 
Burundians by sharing its ration with HIV/AIDS – orphaned children and 
internally displaced people. Besides its great contribution to the restoration 
of peace and stability in Burundi, the contingent has made Ethiopia proud 
by participating in the first ever AU peacekeeping mission (Ethiopian 
MOD, Indoctrinations and Public Relations Center, 2004). 
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The contingent discharged its mission effectively in Burundi for the three years of 
its deployment. Prime Minister Meles, on his visit to the peacekeeping contingent in 
Bujumbura, Burundi in February 2004, said that Ethiopia had dispatched its 
peacekeeping contingent to Burundi as part of its unwavering commitment to peace in the 
African continent, and that the people and government of Ethiopia can take pride in the 
good relationship the Ethiopian Contingent in Burundi has with the people of Burundi 
(ENA, 2004). 
The Burundian president and other senior government officials likewise hailed the 
commitment, determination, and sense of duty of the Ethiopian Peacekeeping Contingent. 
The United Nations Secretary General's special envoy for Burundi, speaking at the 
farewell ceremony held in Burundi, said that the efficient accomplishment of the 
peacekeeping mission passes from generation to generation. One method by which the 
Ethiopian contingent in Burundi sought to discharge its duties was to build harmonious 
relations with the people of Burundi. To cite one example of how they did this, “the 
Ethiopian peacekeeping contingent has donated beds, office furniture, drugs, generator, 
and other materials, valued [at] over 78,000 USD, for governmental and non 
governmental [use], as well as [to] humanitarian organizations in Gitega (Burundi) area” 
(The Ethiopian Herald, 2006). 
3. Ethiopian Participation in the United Nations Assistance Mission in 
Liberia (UNAMIL) 2004–to Date 
The Liberian mission was mandated by the UN Security Council Resolution 1509 
(2003) on September 19, 2003. According to the information of UN DPKO, the mission’s 
major objectives were to observe and monitor the implementation of the ceasefire 
agreement to support the Joint Monitoring Committee, carry out disarmament, and 
support the implementation of the peace process.  Ethiopia, accepting the invitation to 
contribute troops to the UN mission in Liberia, conducted three months of intensive 
peacekeeping training, and sent the first peacekeeping contingent, which consisted of 
troops, medical unit Level I, maintenance, and engineering units to Liberia in January  
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2004.11 Ethiopian troops were deployed in Zwedru, which is the farthest point of UNMIL 
and known as Sector 4, to help realize the peace efforts of the mission (See also 
Appendix C).12  
The Ethiopian peacekeeping contingent in Liberia discharged its duty effectively 
and efficiently (See Appendix A). The peacekeeping brigades took full control of most of 
the seven major regions of Zwedru. The brigade disarmed those in possession of illegal 
arms, stabilized the region, helped create favorable conditions for elections, and looked 
after the security of workers of international charity organizations, officials of the UN 
peacekeeping force, and military observers (Indeshaw, 2004, September 28).   
Liberians, on several occasions, have expressed joy over the presence of the 
Ethiopian peacekeeping contingent in their midst and have vowed to work in cooperation 
with the Ethiopian mission to bring about a dependable and sustainable peace in their 
country. Liberians’ recognition of the Ethiopian contingent has been encouraging. 
According to Brigadier General Seyoum, commander of the 124th Ethiopian 
Peacekeeping Brigade, “Because of the support and cooperation that we got from our 
Liberian brothers and sisters we always feel that we are at home with our family, which 
has helped us a great deal in performing our duties and responsibilities” (Ethiopian MOD, 
2006).  In the contingent's mission areas in Liberia, this atmosphere enabled dislocated 
Liberians to reintegrate with their families in order to lead peaceful lives and contribute 
to rebuilding their nation (Ethiopianembassy.org). The Ethiopian contingents disarmed 
more that 13,000 rebels, assisted 21,629 refugees and displaced persons to return to their 
homes, and facilitated peaceful elections in 273 constituencies in their sector.13 
The Ethiopian contingents accomplished their duty with competence, high 
military discipline, and a great sense of responsibility. Government officials, coordinators 
of non-governmental organizations operating in the country, and the public at large 
                                                 
11 This is usually the first level where a doctor is available. It provides first line primary health care, 
emergency resuscitation, stabilization and evacuation of casualties to the next level of medical care within a 
peacekeeping mission. 
12 Sector 4, this Sector covers most of south-eastern Liberia. It consists of the counties of River Cess, Sinoe, 
Grand Gedeh, River Gee, Grand Kru, Maryland and portion of Nimba, which include volatile areas along the border 
with Cote d'Ivoire. Retrieved on Sept 29, 2006, from http://www.unmil.org/content.asp?ccat=military. 
13 Data from Amharic Draft report on the Ethiopian contingents in Liberia from Ethiopian Ministry of 
Defense media center. 
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acclaimed the activities of the Ethiopian Peacekeeping Contingent, especially its 
participation in various development activities. The Special Envoy of the UN General 
and the officer in charge of the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), Souren 
Seraydarian, said, “The Ethiopian peacekeeping in Liberia enjoyed the confidence and 
admiration of the international community” (Ethiopian MOD, Indoctrinations and Public 
Relations Center, 2004). 
Like their predecessors in earlier peacekeeping missions, the Ethiopian 
peacekeepers in Liberia achieved their goal by employing their trademark tools of 
winning the hearts and minds of the people through their humanity and bravery 
(Ethiopian MOD Indoctrination & Public relations Center, 2004).  Recognizing that 
sustainable peace and stability requires development, the Ethiopian Peacekeeping 
Contingent carried out the repair of roads, sanitation activities, and harnessed a local river 
that hampered the flow of traffic by digging a 300-meter drainage channel (Ethiopia: 
Liberians laud, 2006, June). The Ethiopian contingent also repaired the Zwedru Hospital, 
which had been abandoned following extensive looting (“Liberia – complex emergency” 
(2004). These are just some of the duties they performed. 
E. LEASSONS LEARNED 
1. Positive Image 
One hundred nations contribute forces to UN peacekeeping, but contributions 
from developed nations have declined since the 1990s. Today, the top sixteen troop-
contributing nations to UN operations are all from developing states, led by Pakistan, 
Bangladesh, Nigeria, Ethiopia, and Ghana (UN DPKO, 2004). 
According to the UN’s January 2006 force contribution report, Ethiopia is the 
sixth largest contributor to UN peacekeeping forces in the world, with some 3,421 
military and staff deployed. 
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 Country Police Mil OBs Troop Total 
Burundi (UNOB)  5 859 864 Number of Ethiopian 
troops at the end of Jan 
2006 
Liberia (UNMIL)  17 2531 2548 
Total   22 3390 3412 
 
 
Table 2. Number of Ethiopian Troops at the End of January 2006  
(After: UN DPKO, 2006) 
 
There has been strong support within the diplomatic community to use Ethiopian 
troops as peacekeepers within the UN. “Ethiopian troops ought to be used in regional 
peacekeeping operations, in peacekeeping operations in western Africa, and indeed in 
peacekeeping operations around the globe, operating under a UN framework,” said Myles 
Wickstead, the British ambassador (“Ethiopia to send,” 2003). 
For its part, Ethiopia has continued to reiterate its commitment to peacekeeping in 
Africa and the world. One can ask why Ethiopia sends its troops on peace missions. One 
obvious issue is that:  
Ethiopia sees its own experience of the failure by the League as a valuable 
asset to be inside in the resolution of conflicts. Active participation in 
peacekeeping demonstrates Ethiopia's historically strong endorsement of 
the continent’s cooperation in matters of security (Ethiopia, Champion of 
Peace). 
Ethiopia believes that its internal security is dependent on the security of its 
neighbors, the sub-region, the region, and the world at large. 
Ethiopia, by sending her Expeditionary Force to Korea, not only gave an 
example of her tenacity to the free and democratic institution; not only 
proved her faith in the United Nations Organization (UNO), but also 
demonstrated the fighting ability of her people, and the exceptional 
capability of her officers to administer a modern army, equal to the 
renowned armies of the world. The test, passed by the Ethiopians together 
with the other UN troops in Korea, succeeded completely, and the rating 
deserved by the Ethiopians is excellent. Ethiopia has proved that she is 
capable of sustaining military strength for the service of international 
peace and security (Skordiles, 1954, p. xii). 
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Keeping peace has become an essential part of Ethiopia’s view of its international 
duty for some time now. This both affords the soldiers experience in crisis situations, and 
rewards them with the UN-level salary that goes with such assignments. In Ethiopia’s 
armed forces, as in many developed countries which contribute to peacekeeping forces, 
being deployed for peacekeeping duties is increasingly something soldiers want to do.  
From the author's interviews with the participants of previous and current Liberia 
and Burundi peace missions, it is apparent there are major achievements as well as 
shortfalls in how well Ethiopian contingents discharge their peace missions. The main 
achievement is overall success. All missions where Ethiopian contingents have been 
deployed have been successful. The overall commitment of Ethiopian peacekeeping 
troops is commendable, especially their participation in assisting the local population to 
rebuild and reconstruct essential facilities. This social interaction with the local 
population has simplified the regular UN peacekeeping mission. This has been confirmed 
by Freddie Bategereza, the Tanzanian UNMIL Head of Regional Civil Affairs/Security 
Coordination: 
Having worked with three contingents of Ethiopian peacekeepers, one can 
easily conclude that there is simply an exemplary record. They are very 
dedicated to their work and their civil-military collaboration and 
cooperation is exceptionally good. Their area of responsibility, which 
historically happens to be a region of resistance, has not had any security 
concern due to their strategic system of operation (Ethiopian MOD, 2006).   
These positive features of Ethiopia's contingents should be encouraged. At the 
same time, Ethiopia should be working hard to eliminate identifiable weaknesses and 
shortfalls for better participation in future peacekeeping missions. 
2. Room for Future Improvement 
a. Language Proficiency as Obstacle  
Since Ethiopia’s first Peace Force deployed to Korea, language has been 
and still is a problem in recent peace missions such as Liberia and Burundi. When 
Ethiopian troops were deployed to Rwanda, in order to resolve the language barrier, 
translators were hired and deployed with the contingent. The number of translators was  
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too small compared to the breadth of the area of responsibility of the contingent. Because 
there were few translators in the battalion, it was very difficult to communicate with the 
society and render them the needed assistance.  
This problem, even in current missions, is not getting resolved. Officers, 
who would command from platoon to brigade level, should have the ability to speak and 
communicate in English. In the author's recent interviews, many officers who participated 
in the Liberia and Burundi peace missions said that though the mission accomplishment 
of Ethiopian contingents is considerable and, in some cases, exceeds that of other 
contingents, because of the commanders’ lack of English language skills the troops’ 
performance is not getting due appreciation from the pertinent mission HQs. Moreover, 
because of the language problem, many commanders were not reporting their troops’ 
performance properly, and there were instances when they were not getting the needed 
support from the HQ because of the lack of communications.  
This language problem should receive greater attention and the Ministry of 
Defense should draft a plan for improving English language training among Ethiopian 
officers. This should be done not only for the sake of peacekeeping missions, but also for 
future training abroad, and for creating an interoperable capacity to work in EASBRIG, 
since English is becoming the working language of peace operations and of higher 
education institutions. This should be a major priority in the officers’ training program.  
Compounding communications difficulties are Ethiopians’ natural 
character, modesty, and even shyness. Others report performances of lesser value than 
that of the Ethiopian contingents. More confidence in writing and spoken English should 
assist in overcoming this.  
b. Lack of Adequate Staff Officers’ Preparation 
There is lack of adequate staff officers’ preparation for peacekeeping 
missions in Ethiopia, especially when it comes to military observers and contingent 
commanders at all levels. From platoon commanders to brigade commanders, staff 
officers who would be assigned in HQs are not getting the proper training for their 
missions.  In most cases, this has happened because the selection and preparation of 
personnel who would be deployed for peace missions are not conducted ahead of time. 
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This problem has to be resolved by having a well-developed rotation plan for the training, 
preparation, and deployment of troops, staff members to the HQs, and military observers.   
c. Non-diversified Participation 
Ethiopia does not yet take sufficient advantage of all the opportunities 
given by the UN to deploy more military observers, civilians, and civilian police. 
Ethiopian participation in the Congo peacekeeping mission in the 1960s demonstrated 
that what was needed was not only sending troops, but also civilian police and air force 
personnel with military aircraft. This ability has to be developed. Ethiopia’s participation 
in peacekeeping should include sending the civilian police, volunteer civilians, and 
sufficient air assets whenever they are needed. 
d. Lack of Giving Due Attention to Ceremonial Issues 
In previous peace missions, from Rwanda to current missions in Liberia 
and Burundi, though the discipline and sociability of the Ethiopian troops was greatly 
appreciated, they exhibited certain deficiencies in performing certain military protocols 
that are considered to be an important part of overall troop performance. In the Rwandan 
peace mission there were comments from the UNAMIR HQ that Ethiopian troops were 
not giving due attention to visits by senior commanders, not giving proper salutes, and 
making it difficult to distinguish officers from soldiers by using the same mess and 
recreational facilities, etc.  Because of these problems, senior officers from UNAMIR 
considered the Ethiopian contingent to be undisciplined.  Since many of these troops 
were for the author, guerrilla fighters, and peacekeeping in Rwanda was the first mission 
for the Ethiopians after the overthrow of the Derg regime, there was a lack of formal 
military training. This issue was subsequently given greater attention by the Wegagen 
Battalion (the name of the 2nd contingent). A program was created and implemented to 
improve individual drill and ceremonial skills. The training was organized and conducted 
in conjunction with peacekeeping missions in their deployment area.  Because of this 
training, during the Wegagen’s three-month deployment, the contingent received three 




Currently, in preparation of the author's troops and especially for the 
forces to be deployed to Liberia and Burundi, they are exerting considerable effort, but 
should probably give even more so as to continue to improve the image of the Ethiopian 
Defense Forces for future peacekeeping missions. 
e. Discipline  
In general, the discipline of Ethiopian troops can be evaluated in positive 
terms. However, compared to the standard of well-organized foreign armies, the author 
can say from all the information that he has gathered that the military discipline of the 
Ethiopian soldiers could still be improved upon. The main disciplinary issues, again, tend 
to be more symbolic than substantive, but according to participants of recent missions in 
Liberia and Burundi, it is difficult to tell officers apart from soldiers, soldiers are not 
always properly dressed, and they do not properly salute superior officers, especially 
officers who are from other contingents. There are also indications that rather than give 
orders to subordinates, officers do things themselves. For them, this may be connected to 
with a cultural legacy and guerilla tradition, but in a wider international context it looks 
like a lack of military discipline and respect. At the same time, there were also some 
instances when officers were not able to give an order to their subordinates because of the 
lack of the willingness of soldiers to perform the order. For this reason, it has been 
observed in many instances that instead of giving orders to subordinates, the officers 
themselves would prefer to perform the duty rather order someone else to do it. 
f. Unmatched Selection with the Qualification Needed for the Work 
The problem in recruiting should be given proper attention. In some 
instances, unqualified officers were sent on peacekeeping missions in positions for which 
they were not adequately prepared and in which they lacked professional skill and 
knowledge. Proper criteria and standards should be set and implemented in order to send 
qualified personnel on peacekeeping missions. If the decision is made to send someone 
on a peacekeeping mission and he is not the appropriate person for the position, the 
potential effectiveness and image of the Ethiopian troops is hurt, both abroad and within 
the Armed Forces. 
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Even though Ethiopian peacekeepers have registered more than just a solid 
performance throughout their participation in PKOs, it is still worthwhile to make 
conceptual changes in how to organize and approach the training, and prepare 
peacekeeping forces. Ongoing reform of the Ethiopian Defense Force is addressing the 
need for improvement in this regard. What remains is to strengthen what is done well and 










































V. PROPOSITIONS: SHAPING THE ETHIOPIAN PEACE 
FORCE FOR AN EFFECTIVE CONTRIBUTION IN FUTURE 
PEACE OPERATIONS 
A. COMMITMENT TO INTENSIFY ETHIOPIA’S PARTICIPATION IN 
PKO 
Since 1993, as developed countries have pulled back from multilateral operations, 
African participation in UN peacekeeping has grown. Participation in peacekeeping 
operations by the developing world, including five African countries (Ethiopia, Ghana, 
Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa) has significantly increased (Earnst, 2003). The UN 
data shows that Ghana and Nigeria have taken a leading role in peacekeeping throughout 
Africa. From Ghana alone (with armed forces totaling under 10,000) more than 80,000 
men and women have played a critical role in peacekeeping all over the world (from 
1960 until January 2004) (Afele, 2000). 
Ethiopia’s commitment to contribute its part to the effort to assure peace and 
stability in the region and beyond has increased over time. Recently, Ethiopia has joined 
this movement by resuming its normal leading role and increasing its participation in the 
belief that peacekeeping is now becoming a new and effective way to mitigate conflict. 
Ethiopians are proud that their military is used for peacekeeping so that people in war-
torn areas can still lead normal lives. The Ethiopian Government’s commitment demands 
greater efforts to foster peace and plays a key role both at regional and continental levels. 
Prime Minister Meles Zenawi has confirmed this: 
The ‘iron discipline’ of the Ethiopian forces had won the admiration of the 
two countries [Burundi and Liberia], and that it was for that reason that the 
country was being asked to become involved in such similar peacekeeping 
missions.  In view of the firm support of the Ethiopian people and 
government to African peace, I would like to assure our readiness to 
become involved in the peacekeeping mission in an intensified manner 
(“Meles reaffirms,” 2004). 
In this chapter, based on the analysis and findings of previous chapters, the author 
will mainly deal with the issue of how the Ethiopian Defense Forces should prepare its 
Peace Force in order to fulfill Ethiopia’s commitment for intensified participation in 
future EASBRIG and/or AU and UN peace operations. 
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Figure 3.   Contributors to UN Peacekeeping Operations, as of January 31, 2006. 





Country Police Mil OBs Troop Size of Contingent
1 Bangladesh 476 102 9,576 10,154
2 Pakistan 388 109 9,019 9,516
3 India 393 97 6,849 7,339
4 Jordan  77 2,904 3,731
5 Nepal 448 46 3,023 3,517
6 Ethiopia 22 3,390 3,412
7 Uruguay  1 68 2,527 2,611
8 Ghana  85 64 2,373 2,522
9 Nigeria 390 91 1,956 2,437
10 South Africa 27 1,968 1,995
11 Senegal 464 37 1,387 1,888
12 China 197 72 791 1,060
13 Morocco 5 1,701 1,706
14 Kenya 66 79 1,468 1,613
 
 
Table 3. Contributors to UN Peacekeeping Operations, as of January 31, 2006 (From: 
http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/contributors/2006/jan06_1.pdf) 
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B. ESTABLISHMENT OF STRONG PEACE OPERATIONS OFFICE: AN 
ESSENTIAL MOVE TO REALIZE ETHIOPIA’S COMMITMENT 
From past UN and AU experiences, it is clear that when a crisis arises and there is 
a need to deploy peacekeepers, the most difficult challenge is that countries do not 
provide troops in time. This is, in most cases, because there is no prior preparation of 
troops, there is a lack of equipment, or there is a lack of organizational structure and 
coordination to sufficiently prepare troops. With no ongoing effort to train and maintain 
peace troops prior to the demand to contribute forces, it is obvious countries will be 
forced to prepare their troops in a hasty manner. Consequently, too, countries will deploy 
troops without them having the necessary equipment. To ensure the readiness of 
Ethiopian peace troops and their availability in a timely manner, the Ethiopian Defence 
Forces should establish an adequate and effective system that can provide the necessary 
training and preparation before the need for deployment arises. For this commitment to 
be effective it is essential to have a responsible office which is able to handle the 
functions of troop recruitment, training, equipment, deployment, command, and control. 
The Ethiopian MOD, considering its past experience in preparation, deployment, 
and follow-up with Ethiopian peace troops in their mission areas, has recently established 
an office which should be well-suited to handle peacekeeping issues in a better fashion. 
This has been done with the intent to improve the MOD’s organizational capability in 
regards to peacekeeping issues. Currently this office is incorporated with the Foreign 
Relations Department. Though this is commendable, the existing structure of that office 
may not be sufficient to enable it to render everything necessary, such as organization, 
deployment and follow-up with the peace troops. Professional assessments must be 
continuously made in regards to the weaknesses and strengths of the deployed peace 
troops. Only with this it is possible to readjust and learn how to better use them in future 
deployments, as well as how to better prepare prior to deployments.  
Also, to be effective, it would be better if the office discharged its duties and 
responsibilities under direct supervision of the General Chief of Defence Staff. Moreover, 
since Ethiopia is contributing troops and the UN or the AU is going to cover all the 
expenses for the deployment of these troops, frequent follow-up with the UN and AU 
offices will be required regarding equipment, supply, reimbursement and other inputs. 
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Administrative, logistical, and financial operations should be handled by one office under 
the close supervision of the Chief of Staff’s office. Such missions are very serious on a 
number of levels. For instance, if they are not treated with military professionalism, many 
advantages that could be gained via the UN and AU may be lost, such as foreign training 
assistance, supply and equipment for the troops, and reimbursement for the troops, along 
with their equipment. 
C. STRIVE FOR ATTAINING AND BETTER UTILIZING OF FOREIGN 
ASSISTANCE 
It is the author's belief that if it is found that it is hard to train and prepare troops 
before a deployment when there is sufficient time, an even greater challenge is faced in 
amassing the resources needed for the deployment of troops in an organized fashion. In 
this regard, foreign support is crucial for better and timelier preparation of Ethiopian 
troops for peace operations. Currently, the international community and the developed 
countries in particular are not willing to contribute forces for peacekeeping missions in 
Africa. However, they are willing to assist African states in preparing African 
peacekeeping troops, and Ghana and Kenya are taking particular advantage of this by 
using the support from these countries effectively. 
Ethiopia has a large and professional military that has provided support for UN 
and AU peacekeeping operations in the past. Ethiopia is the fifth largest overall 
contributor and the greatest contributor from Africa to United Nations peacekeeping 
missions. Therefore, one should know how to argue for and effectively use assistance 
from these developed countries. For example, as a U.S. State Department website about 
assistance to Africa indicates for Ethiopia, “the United States will use the African 
Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) Program, along with other 
military assistance funding to increase Ethiopia’s capacity and willingness to participate 
in future peacekeeping missions” (U.S. Assistance to Africa, Ethiopia). This willingness 
by the U.S. points to the need for having a strong peace operations office for getting and 
using foreign support for the preparation of Ethiopia's Peace Force.  
In the troop preparation process, using local resources by way of Ethiopia's own 
instructors is one thing; however, one should also continue searching for foreign offers of 
assistance with the goal of improving the quality of training of the peacekeeping forces. 
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Despite the fact that currently the Peace Support Training Center (PSTC) is trying to get 
and use foreign assistance for its training purposes, it would do even better if there were 
one consolidated office responsible for the overall preparation of peace troops. 
D. INTEGRATING PEACE OPERATION PACKAGES INTO ALL LEVELS 
OF LEADERSHIP TRAINING 
Peacekeeping requires a different approach than combat operations… 
Many assert that to be a good peacekeeper, one must be a good soldier. 
“Peacekeeping is not a job for soldiers, but only soldiers can do it.” States 
the Army Field Manual on peace missions, FM 100-38….In part, this 
argument is based on the recognition that troops in peacekeeping 
operations need military and combat skills to respond to unanticipated 
risks, in part it is based on the judgment that the most credible deterrent to 
those “spoilers” who would disrupt the peace [are] a soldier well-trained 
for combat (Serafino, 2004). 
The Ethiopian MOD is continuing to effectively prepare, deploy, and maintain its 
defense forces to overcome the threats and challenges to the country’s national interests, 
sovereignty, and internal stability. However, since Ethiopian troops are intensively 
engaging in PSO, simply preparing for the traditional role of external defense of the 
armed forces is no longer sufficient for addressing today’s needs. Additional roles have to 
be incorporated into the doctrine, organization, and training of the armed forces (Ehrhart, 
Schnabel, and Blagescu, 2002). 
It should be realized that while basic military training lays a firm and essential 
foundation for the conduct of peace operations, the increasing complexity of 
contemporary peacekeeping demands the development of specific skills and attitudes. 
This need has to be addressed at the level of unit command and staff training at different 
levels of the Ethiopian Armed Forces, from squad leader training to the training of 
officers at the highest levels. 
Currently, the general purpose of Ethiopian military training is fully focused on 
combat and occupational skills.  This provides the core training for units and individuals 
deploying on peace support operations. However, since Ethiopia is committed to 
contribute troops to EASBRIG and the UN, general military knowledge and skills should 
be augmented with ‘non-traditional’ PSO–specific knowledge and skills. This process 
requires integration of PSO knowledge and skills into all military training curriculums.  
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The incorporation of peacekeeping training packages at all levels of leadership 
training will allow soldiers at every rank in the Ethiopian Armed Forces to have a basic 
knowledge of the principal aspects of peace operations. This approach to peacekeeping 
training, coupled with Ethiopia’s past peacekeeping experiences, will assure that every 
member of the Ethiopian Armed Forces will be exposed to basic knowledge of 
peacekeeping operations, which will then ensure a common foundation for troop pre-
deployment training for PSO. 
E. TRAINING THE TROOPS FOR PEACEKEEPING AND PEACE 
ENFORCEMENT 
Troop contributing countries [States] shall immediately, upon request by 
the Commission, following an authorization by the Peace and Security 
Council or the Assembly, release the standby contingents with the 
necessary equipment for the operations envisaged. . .  (AU Protocol, 
2002). 
Ethiopia has a large military and it has been working to improve its capacity to 
participate in peace operations. Its next effort should focus not only on maximizing its 
participation, but also on improving the quality of its participation.  The Ethiopian 
military must train for developing skills both to defend its country from aggressors and to 
engage in peace operations. Currently Ethiopia, being a member of the East African sub-
region, has committed itself to contribute troops to EASBRIG. Moreover, since Ethiopia 
is committed to contribute troops to the UN and AU, it may be asked to respond 
immediately should a conflict in the sub-region arise. This highlights the need to organize 
peacekeeping contingents and be ready for any emergency requests made by EASBRIG, 
the AU, or the UN.   
For what missions exactly is Ethiopia going to prepare the force? This question 
now has a clear answer. The AU is planning to deploy its standby forces for 
peacekeeping, and also, when necessary, for peace enforcement missions. Ethiopia, as a 
country contributing forces to EASBRIG, is also expected to deploy its troops for all the 
AU mission scenarios. Therefore, it is essential that in the preparation of Ethiopian peace 
troops they be able to conduct all types of peace operations successfully, from the 
traditional Chapter VI peacekeeping to more demanding Chapter VII peace enforcement. 
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1. Training for Peacekeeping Missions 
Peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions are to be accomplished in different 
conditions and typically require different means. Peacekeeping implies that parties in a 
conflict agree to a cease-fire, and accept the presence of specific and neutral forces to 
guarantee its observance. Although the peacekeepers’ involvement is aimed at conflict 
reduction, they should not use their weapons except in self-defense. There might be 
situations which demand peacekeepers’ actions but these are worst-case scenarios. For 
example, during the deployment of ECOMOG in Liberia there were many clashes 
involving ECOMOG troops. Soldiers were held hostage and killed for unknown reasons 
by fighting parties. In some instances, rebels also attacked ECOMOG units. During these 
incidents, ECOMOG’s ability to defend or to release the hostages was very limited. As 
the Liberian example suggests, peacekeepers are always liable to be exposed to attacks by 
fighting parties who breach the cease-fire with the aim of gaining some advantage in 
whatever negotiations that may be ongoing.   
Because Ethiopians may find themselves in a situation similar to that of 
ECOMOG soldiers, it is essential that all members of the contingent complete an 
extensive pre-deployment training course. The responsibility for this training obviously is 
going to lie with the peace operations office in collaboration with the Training Main 
Department and other relevant departments. The leading role should rest with the peace 
operations office. This pre-deployment training should prepare troops based on the flow 
of information about all known aspects of the mission. Officers, especially, may be 
trained in the Peacekeeping Training Center, utilizing an information package that is 
provided beforehand. The content of this will be examined in greater detail in the next 
chapter.  
In general, the pre-deployment training can be divided into five sections: 
operational training, health briefing, administrative briefing, cultural awareness program, 





Specifics on training may include: 
• Operational training sessions can be implemented if the mission mandate 
requires the peacekeepers to exercise executive powers (i.e., full police 
authority/powers) during their mission. Firearms training, self-defense 
training, criminal intelligence briefing and the Incident Management 
Intervention Model briefing are examples of Operational training. 
• The health briefing is designed to prepare the peacekeepers mentally and 
physically. This is aimed at giving mission-specific information 
concerning the hazards to peacekeepers’ health. (e.g., prevalence of 
disease, prophylactic measures, etc.). 
• Administrative briefings would describe the administrative duties of 
troops in mission. 
• The cultural awareness program provides information about the new 
cultural surroundings of the troops. This should not be limited to the 
country to which peacekeepers will be deployed, but may also include the 
cultures of the many partners who will be working with Ethiopian 
peacekeepers during their mission abroad. 
•  “Training on International Humanitarian Law and International Human 
Rights Law, with particular emphasis on the rights of women and children, 
shall be an integral part of the training of such personnel” (AU Protocol. 
2002, July 9-10). 
2. Training for Peace Enforcement Missions 
Peace enforcement is one of the missions that the EASBRIG could have to 
perform in the future to stop conflicts from escalating. Troops may be deployed for the 
purpose of peace enforcement against one party, especially when someone violates the 
peace in a certain region or situation. This mission may be mandated from the beginning, 
before deployment of the troops to the mission area, or the peacekeeping mission may 
shift to a peace enforcement mission, as it occurred in Somalia (UNOSOM Mandate, 
1992).  This type of mission is risky and requires military and peace support fighting 
capabilities. In order to be effective in such a mission, intense military training is 
required.  
Since this type of operation means being engaged in fighting, casualties can be 
expected and losses are likely. As was seen even in traditional peacekeeping missions, 
self-defense capabilities of soldiers are essential and must be maintained. This was seen 
when seven Kenyan peacekeepers were killed in the line of duty even though they were 
among 130 of Kenya’s best-trained soldiers sent to keep the peace in Sierra Leone, when 
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that country was at war with itself (Somalia Watch news, 2000, May).  It needs to be 
recognized that since Ethiopia will be sending its soldiers on dangerous assignments, they 
should be equipped with the necessary weapons and have sufficient training to enable 
them to avoid the fate of the Kenyan peacekeepers. 
The commanders and staff officers should be especially well-prepared and have 
the capability to assess the danger posed by the parties to the local conflict, analyze the 
complex situation on the ground, anticipate the development of new situations, and 
design possible courses of action to either use Ethiopian peacekeepers effectively or avert 
danger and future danger to them. However, as important as training is, priority should 
actually be given to the matter of selecting officers who are qualified for these types of 
missions in the first place. This is vital. 
Attaining operational readiness of EASBRIG is key to the ASF’s effectiveness as 
a whole. As Mitmkulu (2005) states, “The depth of each country’s commitment to AU 
programs can be measured by the level of readiness of the pledged military regional ASF 
units.”  For the realization of this concept, one needs to get away from the idea of training 
or preparing only two or three battalions for peace operations. There is a need to train 
many of the forces so that they can be deployed or employed in any situation. To be 
ready for all eventualities requires having adequate supplies and training. 
F. ETHIOPIAN PEACE SUPPORT TRAINING CENTER  
1. The Establishment of EPSTC 
The Ethiopian Peace Support Training Center (EPSTC) is the center of excellence 
for peace support training. The Peace Support Training Center initially started at the 
beginning of 2005, at the Hurso Training Center in the eastern part of Ethiopia, 525 
kilometers from Addis Ababa. Its aim was to keep pace with the ever-changing training 
requirements of the PSO of the Ethiopian Peace Force. Currently the Center has relocated 
to Debre Zeit, 45 km east of Addis Ababa. Now the EPSTC is responsible for the training 
of individuals designated for PSOs and is responsible for providing assistance to 
peacekeeping units in the designing and conducting of PSO training. 
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The school is run by the Training Main Department.  The school currently 
prepares Ethiopian Forces personnel for deployment anywhere in the world for any peace 
support operation. The school’s main mission, which is very similar to the Canadian 
PSTC Mission and Task (Canadian PSTC Mission and Task, 2003), is to provide a 
nucleus of expertise within the Ethiopian Defense Forces (EDF). This nucleus is in turn 
responsible for the development of peace support techniques (based on lessons learned), 
training methodology, training standards, and the provision of training and training 
support. The school is newly organized and needs more assistance from developed 
countries to conduct effective courses in the future. With this intent, the school is trying 
to maintain close links with other centers of excellence across the continent, especially 
with the peacekeeping schools in East Africa (e.g. Kenya). This co-operation has resulted 
in instructor exchanges, sharing of courseware, and better global training standards.  
The training center, since its creation, has managed to handle the preparation of 
peacekeeping commanders, military observers and contingents prior to their 
deployments. Its contribution to preparing contingents and MIL OBs has been 
considerable (Tefera, 2006, July). What is needed now is to strengthen its efforts through 
enhancing instructors’ capacity and lessons learned from previous missions.  
The training center’s guidelines for preparing Ethiopian troops for PSO should 
mainly focus on eliminating shortfalls and enhancing the positive experiences of the 
troops, based on lessons learned from previous missions. This can be handled through 
analysis of the performance of peacekeepers upon their return from PSO. 
In general, the Peacekeeping Training Center’s main tasks could be the following: 
• Develop and standardize peacekeeping tactics and techniques for 
instruction at the center 
• Conduct peacekeeping training for selected levels of command courses 
(company, battalion) and military observers who would deploy for peace 
missions 
• Disseminate the experience gained by units and personnel which have 
participated in peace operations using  the medium of training 
• Produce and constantly update a handbook on peace operations, to be used 
as pocket references by individual officers and NCOs during both training 
and operations 
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• Participate in the curriculum development of all command levels of 
training to incorporate the peace support training packages 
2. Training of Individuals 
Ethiopian Forces members selected for deployment on a peace support operation 
that would be part of a contingent or unit in the future should be trained at PSTC. In 
regards to individual training, the school can render two types of courses: a basic course 
in PSO and a military observer course for how the PSO could be conducted. These 
courses could be scheduled throughout the year. 
a. Peace Support Operations  Basic Course 
The Peace Support Operations Basic Course should be designed to prepare 
individual commanders and soldiers for future peacekeeping missions. All Ethiopian 
Forces members who are selected and assigned as individuals to a PSO should attend the 
course, regardless of military occupation, element, or rank. The course should focus on 
general military skills and knowledge with preparation for deployment to a PSO 
environment. The duration of the course should depend on the objective and the breadth 
of the course content. 
The course content could be loosely grouped into three main parts: 
• Mission specific information, such as the current operation 
structure and mandate, cultural awareness training, and the rules of 
engagement for the mission area 
• Personal effectiveness knowledge, such as preventive medicine 
techniques, stress management techniques, and an awareness of 
threats and risks in a PSO such as operating in a mined 
environment 
• Pre-deployment preparations that include legal preparations, 
family support, and allowances and benefits (Canadian PSTC 
Mission and Task, 2003). 
b. Peace Support Operations Military Observer Course  
The Peace Support Operations Military Observer (PSO MIL OBs) course 
may last one month. Officers selected as United Nations Military Observers should attend 
the qualification course. This should not include the language preparation phase. 
According to Col Tefera Haile (July 2006), the Center’s commander, this task has been 
granted to the EPSTC for two years and it has trained three groups, each consisting of 26 
MIL OBs. 
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For better future preparation of MIL OBs, the course should be built on 
the knowledge contained in the PSO Basic Course with the addition of topics specific to 
Military Observer duties and tasks. The course should also contain several practical 
exercises to simulate the unique and challenging environment in which a Military 
Observer will operate. The PSO Military Observer course may run two to four times a 
year. The officers’ course and military observers’ course programs should cover essential 
peace-operations issues, from human rights cooperation and coordination to negotiation 
and peace building initiatives. This course, coupled with the prior English language 
preparation, will enable the officer corps to acquire the knowledge and skills it needs to 
be effective in complex peace-operations environments.  
The MIL OBs training should focus on creating qualified and competent 
personnel and the training should meet all the requirements and prerequisites of the UN 
for the training of MIL OBs. The MIL OBs training of the Canadian Force may be a 
model for Ethiopian MIL OBS training, which focuses mainly on:  
• Being employed in a variety of missions that differ in their terrain, 
climate, level of intensity and degree of isolation, in urban and 
rural areas away from immediate support 
• The MIL OB is employed as a member of a small multinational 
team, and may be required to lead that team. This will require 
command and leadership capability, for patrols, Ops and Ops 
centers, and negotiation/mediation (“Canadian Forces,” 2003). 
The overall final goal of the Military Observers training should be to 
enable the officers to perform the following activities: 
• Monitor the disarmament, demobilization, regrouping and 
cantonment processes of military forces  
• Assist in the location and confiscation of weapons caches  
• Maintain liaison with and between belligerent factions, other 
(civilian) UN agencies, NGOs, and neighboring countries  
• Provide assistance to humanitarian agencies in the supervision and 
conduct of prisoners of war exchanges, food distribution, the 
provision of medical care, etc.  
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In order to achieve the above-mentioned goal the Center may introduce 
the following lesson topics for MIL OBs:14 
• The MIL OB’s role  in the context of the UN and UN PSO 
• Understanding the personal conduct and ethics expected from an 
Ethiopian Mil OBs on PSO 
• History and evolution of a PSO and understanding of AU/UN 
peace mechanisms and content 
• Duties of MIL OBs  
• Knowledge,  discussion and application of disarmament, 
demobilization and reintegration (DDR) 
• Risks and threats inherent to a PSO 
• List the organizations and discuss the role of  nonmilitary NGO, IO 
and UN agencies which may be operating in the PSO environment 
• The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and its relationship to 
UN operations and individual conduct and responsibility 
• Organizational design of the UN office responsible for  mission 
support 
• The Law of Armed Conflict  
• The use of force for self-defense and ROEs  
• Mission -specific information, such as mission statement, 
intelligence situation, terrain, cultural awareness and operational 
environment 
• Briefing by Ethiopians regarding personal experiences on previous 
missions 
• Personal requirements for deployment of MIL OBs, such as legal 
issues, allowances and benefits, pre-deployment administrative 
requirements 
• Operational skills development, such as, how to conduct a MIL 
OBs patrol, escort, direct an OP or an Ops Center, conduct 
negotiations or mediate a dispute 
• Other basic MIL OB skills, such as mine awareness, equipment 
and weapons recognition, how to observe and report, force 
protection, investigation techniques, driving skills, land navigation 
skills, UN communications procedures, staff duty, conduct of 
liaison  and verification, understand the relations with the media, 
MIL OBs first aid 
                                                 
14 The basic idea is drawn from the Canadian experience. 
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Military personnel at different levels of leadership and police personnel, 
after having received individual peacekeeping skills, need to have the chance to put into 
practice their skills in the PSTC prior to joining the contingent. Though the Ethiopian 
Peacekeeping Training Center is in its infancy, its vision should be including a variety of 
hands-on and field training exercises. In general, this training can be oriented towards 
developing essential qualities and conveying specific skills for peacekeeping. 
3. Training Assistance to Units/Formed Contingents  
Since the center’s establishment, it has organized teams of instructors and 
conducted pre-deployment training for three contingents, each consisting of one battalion 
which deployed to Burundi, and seven battalions which deployed to Liberia under the UN 
mandate (Tefera, 2006, July). The training teams worked to provide PSO training, advice, 
assistance and support to peace contingents, which were formed units. The training team 
offered a full range of services and products that were tailored to meet the specific 
requirements of these contingents. 
4. Evaluation and Validation 
For the purposes of improving the quality of its training and producing qualified 
personnel for PSO, the EPSTC has to conduct reviews of the performance of 
peacekeepers after their return to Ethiopia through questionnaires, interviews, reports and 
other means. The PSTC team of instructors also may travel into theatres of operation to 
convene discussion groups with former students and their supervisors. This can be done 
with selected personnel who participated in PSO to review what went right and what 
went wrong in actual mission implementation. Using the feedback and lessons learned, 
the school should constantly develop and improve PSO-related instructional material.  
Likewise, as with any instructional establishment, the PSTC is expected to 
conduct reviews of all courses. Input to these sessions comes from student questionnaires, 
student critiques and staff observations. Another method of improvement of skills is the 
use of after action analysis. With research along these lines, the centre can develop and 
improve its PSO-related instructional material. 
G. PRE-DEPLOYMENT UNIT TRAINING 
Designated units should receive six to eight weeks of mission-specific, pre-
deployment training on a joint basis that includes the core infantry unit and integrated 
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specialists, such as engineers and military police. Unit-level peace operations training 
should focus on the special dimensions of peace operations; this is because soldiers have 
already mastered basic military skills prior to their selection to a peacekeeping battalion. 
At the same time, it is critical to give commanders prior training on peace support 
operation issues, since it is especially important that they be able to focus on adjusting 
attitudes and approaches from strictly military and combat-oriented tasks to PSO tasks.  
The pre-deployment training for peace operations may take six to eight weeks and 
should include the following aspects: 
• General introduction to peacekeeping 
• Geography of the host country 
• Background history to the conflict 
• Culture, habits, religion, and characteristics of the local people 
• Language training (useful elementary phrases such as greetings, thanks, 
halt, etc.) 
• Specific task preparation (use of force, etc.) 
• Review of SOPs and contingency plans (state of readiness, evacuation 
plans, disaster plans, etc.) 
• Weapons and equipment identification 
• Civil/military co-operation 
• Force mandate, status of force agreement and other protocols 
• The principles and rules of neutrality, reliability, and impartiality 
• Updates on the situation in the area of operations  
The final goal in training and preparation of Ethiopian peace troops for peace 
missions should be to enable the contingent to achieve interoperability with other 
contingents. Committed peacekeeping troops, despite having their origins in different 
countries, are expected to maneuver and operate as a single unit. In the Liberian 
experience, the area where the Ethiopian contingent deployed (Sector 4) was under the 
responsibility of an Ethiopian commander. In this zone were different countries’ 
contingents who were working under the Ethiopian commander and had to cooperate in 
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order to fulfill the mission’s objective. 15  The team of instructors from the EPSTC and 
other experienced officers who have participated in previous peace operations could 
make a significant contribution to the preparation of peace troops in this regard. 
Indeed, in general, it is not only worthwhile for officers and NCOs who have had 
experience in peace operations to assist with training and preparation, but it is in keeping 
with Ethiopia’s own peacekeeping legacy. “The officers of first Kagnew Battalion, who 
had already gained experience in the Korean War, have been ordered to assume the 
special training of the fighters of the third Kagnew Battalion” (Skordiles, 1954, p. 118). 



























                                                 
15 Military units attached to this Sector were three Ethiopian Infantry Battalions located at Greenville, 
Tappita, Zwedru and Cestos City; one Senegalese Infantry Battalion and Senegalese Level II Hospital in Harper; and a 




VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSION 
Many do not realize that African nations already provide close to 30 
percent of United Nations peacekeeping forces worldwide, with four 
African countries — Ethiopia, Nigeria, Ghana, and South Africa — 
among the top 10 UN troop contributors (Frazer, 2005). 
Since the overthrow of the Derg regime in Ethiopia and the formation of a 
democratic regime in 1994, domestic and international expectations have been 
heightened in regards to Ethiopia’s role as an important member of the international 
community. These expectations indicate that Ethiopia has a leading role to play in the 
continent’s peace missions. 
The nature of these missions has changed noticeably over the past decade. This 
has been indicated in a South Africa White Paper on Peacekeeping Participation (1998): 
In less than a decade, United Nations peace operations have evolved 
rapidly and in an ad hoc fashion, from classical peacekeeping (involving 
military interposition to monitor inter-state cease-fire agreements) to 
complex multidimensional interventions where the military component is 
but one of many participants within an involved peace process. 
Peacekeeping missions have become, essentially, multidimensional conflict 
management operations. Peace operations involve the concerted effort of the military, 
civilians, and police officers. So far, Ethiopia has only been contributing military 
contingents and military observers. 
Though still only in small numbers, Ethiopia has started to send military 
observers on recent missions to Liberia and Burundi. Initially, less preparation was given 
to the military observers after their selection and not even the second group received 
sufficient background or training, given the rapidity with which they were deployed. 
Fortunately, Ethiopian Peace Support Training Center has taken over the responsibility to 
prepare the MIL OBs, which represents a major step forward. This must be further 
strengthened and the peacekeeping training center should build its capacity to prepare the 
MIL OBs with an adequate program and with experienced instructors. The selection of 
these observers should be performed ahead of time, even when there is no immediate 
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demand for the deployment of military observers. This prior preparation will facilitate the 
conduct of proper selection, provide sufficient training time, and could enable the school 
to conduct the full curriculum without any need for short cuts or omissions. 
Beyond the MIL OB’s training, according to the country’s resource[s], as 
much as possible, it is advisable to use every opportunity to send officers 
to attend a wide variety of peacekeeping courses in the region and abroad. 
This will establish a collection of knowledge and expertise among career 
officers, which can be utilized to enrich the quality of existing and planned 
training program for peace operations (“White Paper on SA,” 1998). 
Altogether, this would ensure a pool of competent personnel who would be 
available for any peacekeeping assignment. 
The preparation and deployment of contingents up to now has generally been 
positive, though it has been conducted on short notice, mostly after the government 
accepted the UN request for a troop contribution. For better results, the preparation of 
contingents should be conducted ahead of time even in a situation when there is no 
immediate request from the UN or AU. Careful attention should be given to the selection 
of qualified officers for all command and staff posts. Generally, preparation should focus 
on enabling troops to achieve:  
• The separation of combatants  
• The disarmament of irregular forces  
• The demobilization and transformation of regular and irregular forces into 
a unified army  
• Assistance with reintegration into civil society  
• Assistance with elections for new governments  
Ethiopia has pledged to contribute forces to EASBRIG. These forces are 
comprised of people with different skills who need special training and particular skills 
and expertise in communications, field engineering (including mine clearing), medical, 
and command and control functions relevant to peace support operations. In this regard, 
their preparation and training should also be conducted by their own experts as well as in 
the field of peacekeeping. They also should pass through the courses of the Peacekeeping 
Training Center.   
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A review of Ethiopian’s past and present peace missions demonstrates that there 
have been major achievements as well as shortfalls in the capacity of Ethiopian 
contingents to discharge their peace missions. Despite the fact that all missions of 
Ethiopian contingents have been successful and their overall commitment is 
commendable — especially their participation in assisting the local population to rebuild 
and reconstruct essential facilities — there have also been weaknesses that should be 
eliminated and/or improved. They should be working hard to eliminate identifiable 
weaknesses and shortfalls for even greater rates of success in future peacekeeping 
missions. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Peacekeeping Allowances as a Potentially Contentious Issue 
In many cases, the absence of clear and fair payment of allowances for UN 
peacekeeping participants could cause disciplinary problems in the army.  Individual 
governments pay troops serving in UN peacekeeping operations according to their own 
national rank and salary scale. The United Nations reimburses countries volunteering 
military contingents and police units. The standard rates, approved by the General 
Assembly, are used to compensate the pay and allowances of all troops, along with 
supplementary payment for specialists (within infantry, logistics contingents, and formed 
police units). In addition, troop-contributing countries are reimbursed for the usage of 
personal clothing, gear, and equipment, including personal weaponry. According to the 
UN DPKO web site on how are peacekeepers compensated,  
The current rates of reimbursement paid by the UN to troop contributing 
countries per peacekeeper per month include: $1,028 for pay and 
allowances; $303 supplementary pay for specialists; $68 for personal 
clothing, gear and equipment; and $5 for personal weaponry. 
Many countries issue clear directives about the per diem rates for their soldiers 
who are deployed on UN peacekeeping missions. On the first mission to Rwanda, when 
the Ethiopian contingent was deployed, there were no clear instructions about the 
allowances of the peacekeepers. The Guna Battalion was located next to the Ghanaian 
contingent. The Ethiopian peacekeepers had the opportunity to meet and discuss many 
issues regarding the Ghanaians’ experience in peacekeeping missions. The Ethiopian 
peacekeepers were told by the Ghanaian peacekeepers that many of them had participated 
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in many missions and earned considerable money and had built houses, bought cars, and 
set aside money for their future needs. This issue, especially at the end of the first 
mission, was hot and even during the Chief of Staff’s tour (in which the author 
participated), the contingent commander brought up the fact that there should be some 
arrangement in regards to the UN allowance for peacekeepers when they ended the 
mission.  
Consequently, after the Guna contingent accomplished its mission and returned to 
Ethiopia it was recognized that something had to be done. There was a two-three days 
long discussion with the peacekeepers regarding the amount that they were going to be 
paid by the government. Many who accepted the amount that the government paid them 
then deserted from the army, taking the money they got, believing that they could lead a 
good life with that money. Others, though they continued their service, were still 
seriously affected, as was morale, and as a result a significant number of them were not 
happy.  
In fact, the Ethiopian government, learning from such lessons, has put in place a 
plan for how peacekeepers are to be paid on their return home. The author believes the 
sum decided upon should be based on studying the experiences of different countries. 
Ethiopian peacekeepers find themselves working alongside peacekeepers from many 
other countries. These peacekeepers have the opportunity to discuss many things, 
including the allowances that they are being paid by their governments. Given this 
context and the ability of peacekeepers to compare notes, the standard of allowance, 
should be reasonable and acceptable to the peacekeepers. 
The UN allowance issue is a very sensitive and dangerous issue for any military. 
When the author was a student in 1974, he remembers that participants in the Congo 
Peacekeeping Mission demonstrated and demanded that the Haile Selassie government 
issue them their unpaid allowances after so many years. Alternatively, there is a more 




Non-payment of entitlements due to Nigerian soldiers and officers who 
took part in international peacekeeping operations is a source of unease 
inthe nation’s armed forces and military authorities were said to be scared 
stiff that the development could degenerate into discontent among the rank 
and file of the armed forces (Global Policy Forum, 2002). 
A related issue is that the amount of the allowance should be declared to 
peacekeepers before their departure. Announcing this up front will show transparency, 
create clarity, and will preclude problems from arising later. The same holds for the 
amount of money that the government will deduct. This deduction should be 
proportional. Here, too, it is a good idea to refer to the experiences of other countries and 
then take into account Ethiopia's economic level and other factors. Everybody needs to be 
made aware of the rationale behind the calculations. In the Nigerian situation for instance 
“Each of the affected soldiers is entitled to 900 dollars per month while 1,200 dollars is 
due to each officer, although the authorities deduct 300 dollars from each participant’s 
pay for the use of the military in maintenance and rehabilitation of equipment” (Global 
Policy Forum, 2002). 
Money always raises problems. For example, as was seen after the Rwandan 
mission when many soldiers received the accumulated funds from the government and 
then quit and returned to civilian life, one can lose experienced warriors and 
peacekeeping personnel if other effects are not made to retain them, maybe to include the 
promise of future deployments.  
2. Expand Ethiopia’s Fields of Participation in Peacekeeping Missions 
Ethiopia’s participation in Peacekeeping Operations up to now has mainly 
focused on sending military contingents. Ethiopia's participation in peace operations 
should be multilateral, which means the involvement of the Air Force, civilians with 
different skills who would participate in different UN activities, and civilian police. 
a. Participation of Police Force in Peace Operation 
A key component of contemporary peace operations is police officers. 
Members of the Ethiopian police force were sent to the Congo Peace Mission with the 1st 
Tekil Brigade with the aim of performing police duties and traffic services in the area 
where the Ethiopian contingent was deployed. However, since the UN regulation of that 
time did not permit the presence of police, these police officers and NCOs were assigned 
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to military duties with the contingent.16  Now, with the further development of 
peacekeeping operations, the role of civilian police in peacekeeping missions has grown. 
Police conduct patrols, provide training, and advise local police services to help ensure 
compliance with human rights standards and assist in promoting the rule of law.  
To the best of the author's knowledge, Ethiopian police officers are not 
currently participating in peacekeeping operations. However, for future peace operations, 
participation by police officers should be encouraged. They would need to be properly 
trained to be capable of assisting in peacekeeping efforts to ensure that law and order is 
maintained effectively and impartially, and that human rights and fundamental freedoms 
are fully protected. To these ends, the police and military institutions should establish 
communications, especially about the selection and preparation of their officers and 
effective use of scarce resources to eliminate unnecessary effort and duplication. 
b. Air Force Participation in Peace Operations 
The Air Force is the other component that should be incorporated into 
future peacekeeping operations. Ethiopia sent four Air Force aircraft to Congo, which 
showcased Ethiopia’s overall military capacity in an era when many African states were 
still colonies. This contribution was much appreciated. Ethiopia's Air Force should 
continue this legacy and should be encouraged to participate in future peace operations, 
along with military contingents and civilian police.  EASBRIG is mostly expecting to be 
deployed in the Eastern sub-region, so in this case Air Force helicopters and small 
transport planes may be deployed, much as the Ethiopian Air Force did in the 1960s in 
Congo. Nigeria and other countries do this frequently today. 
c. Participation of Volunteer Civilians 
Sending civilians on peace operations is not a current practice for 
Ethiopia. However, this is a very common practice in other African countries that 
participate heavily in peace operations, such as Nigeria, Ghana, and Kenya (see 
Appendix B). In the author's case, civilians are hired only for the purposes of language 
translation and food preparation for contingents. 
                                                 
16 This is based on the author's translation from the Amharic report written by Col Teshome Irgetu 
commander of the 2nd Tekil Brigade in Congo to maj. Gen Issayas Gebresilase , commander of the Ethiopian Ground 
Forces. 
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In this regard, the approach should be changed since non-governmental 
organizations have become increasingly important players in the humanitarian and human 
rights areas.  To create favorable conditions for participation by Ethiopian civilians as 
volunteers will likely become an increasingly important issue. These civilians could be 
engaged in a variety of activities, such as electoral monitoring and assistance, promoting 
and monitoring human rights, monitoring disarmament and adherence to sanctions, and 
providing humanitarian assistance.  Specialized contractors could even engage in de-
mining activities. 
3. Peacekeeping Policy as a Tool to be Well-Organized 
The government has reiterated its commitment to participate in peacekeeping 
operations for the realization of peace and stability in the sub-region, and in Africa as a 
whole. In this regard, it is strongly recommended that a policy is developed at the 
political level which would provide conceptual clarity as to the boundaries of peace 
operations, so that Ethiopia's Peace Force may participate more fully and confidently in 
future peace operations. There is a particular need for development of a common 
approach in regards to the situations in which Ethiopia's peace troops should participate 
and the processes by which they are selected to prepare and participate. This should be 
clearly articulated, ideally by the political body responsible for peacekeeping policy 
relating to peace support operations, and military support for relief and humanitarian 
operations. This in turn would assist the MOD in its development of guiding principles, 
and would enable it to design detailed directives in regards to the duties and 
responsibilities of each department for the support of the preparation and deployment of 
Ethiopia's peace troops.  
Moreover, this peacekeeping policy should spell out what the procedures and 
requirements for recruitment should be and how peace troops are going to be trained and 
for what kinds of peacekeeping missions.  For instance, too, how is one going to prepare, 
deploy and implement command and control of the peacekeepers? What is the 
involvement of other departments of the MOD in regards to troop preparation and 
support for the deployment throughout its duration? In general, the MOD may be 
responsible for the development of the peacekeeping policy. However, the principal 
guiding ideas should emanate from and be forwarded to the proper political entities.   
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The author raises these sample questions so that these and other relevant issues 
can be evaluated and properly addressed. Most ideal would be for an independent office 
and staff to be organized, with qualified staff members handling such issues directly 
under the Chief of Staff’s office. There are many good lessons that can be learned from 
previous deployments, which suggest ways in which improvement can continue, to 
include improving organizational capacity to engaging in PSO. With acceptance of the 
need for having a responsible office for peacekeeping issues, one can move even further 
forward by separating it from the foreign relations office, and making it a critical 
component within the MOD. 
C. SUMMARY 
The first Ethiopian peace mission, Ethiopia’s participation in Korean War to 
defend the principle of collective Security of the UN, has significant meaning for current 
and future member of the Ethiopian Armed Forces to recognize its legacy in 
peacekeeping missions: they were there at the outset.  This tradition, Ethiopia’s 
commitment to contribute its part to the effort to assure peace and stability in the region 
and beyond, has increased over time in the belief that peacekeeping is now becoming a 
new and effective way to mitigate conflict. However, this commitment demands greater 
efforts to foster peace and plays a key role both at regional and continental levels. Its next 
effort should focus not only on maximizing its participation, but also on improving the 
quality of its participation.  
The Ethiopian military must train for developing skills both to defend its country 
from aggressors and to engage in peace operations. The Ethiopian MOD is continuing to 
effectively prepare, deploy, and maintain its defense forces to overcome the threats and 
challenges to the country’s national interests, sovereignty, and internal stability. Besides 
this, since Ethiopian troops are intensively engaging in PSO, it is also essential to prepare 
its troop to be effective in future peace missions. 
Currently Ethiopia has committed itself to contribute troops to EASBRIG, AU, 
and UN and it may be asked to respond immediately should a conflict in the sub-region 
or in the region arise. Therefore all efforts must be exerted to organize peacekeeping 
contingents and be ready for any emergency requests made by EASBRIG, the AU, or the 
UN.   
83
APPENDIX A.  ETHIOPIA’S PAST AND PRESENT PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS 
No. Contingents Duration Commander No of Troops Remarks 
ETHIOPIA’S FIRST INTERNATIONAL MISSION IN KOREA, UNITED NATIONS COMMAND KOREA (UNCK) 
(1951 – 1956)  COLONEL KEBEDE GEBRE – COMMANDING OFFICER OF THE ETHIOPIAN EXPEDITIONARY 
FORCE 
1 
1st Kagnew Battalion June 51-April 52 Lt. Col Aman Andom later on 
Lt. Col Teshome Irgetu 
2 
2nd  Kagnew Battalion April 52-April 53 Lt. Col Asfaw Andarge 
3 
3rd  Kagnew Battalion April 53-April 54 Lt. Col Welde Yohannes Shita 
4 
4th  Kagnew Battalion Lt. Col Asfaw Habtemariam 
5 
 
5th  Kagnew Battalion 
 
 
April 1954-Aug 1956  











In 235 engagements 
122 Killed and 566 
Wounded; no one 
was captured 
(Skordiles, 1954). 
ETHIOPIAN PARTICIPATION IN UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN THE CONGO (ONUC) (JULY 1960-JUNE 
1964) 
1 
1st Tekil Brigade 
 
July 1960- June 1961 Col Weldeyohanis Shita    
2 
2nd  Tekil Brigade 
 
June 1961-April 1962 Col Teshome Irgetu  
3 
3rd  Tekil Brigade 
 
May 1962-April 1963 Col Werku Metaferia    
4 
4th  Tekil Brigade 
 





ETHIOPIAN PARTICIPATION IN UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION IN RWANDA (UNAMIR) 1994-1995 
 
1 
Guna Battalion Aug  1994- April 1995 Col Taddele Gebresilase 830 61 officers, 61 
NCO, 684 soldiers, 
18 civilians 
2 
Wegagen Battalion April 1995- July 1995 Col Alemishet Degife  
(Currently Maj. Gen.) 
830  
ETHIOPIAN PARTICIPATION IN THE UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN BURUNDI (ONUB), 2003-TO DATE.  
Brig. Gen. GEBRAT  AYELE, DEPUTY FORCE COMANDER 
1 
1st Wegagen Battalion Aug 2003-Aug 2004 Lt. Col Meley Amare 841 116 officers, 432 
NCO, 328 soldiers 
2 
2nd Wegagen Battalion Aug 2004-June 2005 Col Gebre Gebre Mariam 843 92 officers, 322 
NCO, 429 soldiers 
3 
3rd Wegagen Battalion June 2005-March 2006 Col Negash Hiluf 841 62 officers, 476 
NCO, 303 soldiers 
4 
4th Wegagen Battalion April 2006-Aug. 2006 Col Yirdaw G/ Ananaya 192 18 officers, 18 
NCO, 156 soldiers 
ETHIOPIAN PARTICIPATION IN THE UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION IN LIBERIA (UNAMIL) 2004- 
TO DATE 
1 
87th PK Brigade Dec 2003-Sept 2004 Brig. Gen. Kemal Gelchu 1785 205officers, 467 
NCO, 1113 soldiers 
2 
137th PK Brigade Oct 2004- June 2005 Brig. Gen. Tsegaye Tesema 2,548 275officers, 805 
NCO, 1468 soldiers 
3 
124th PK Brigade June 2005-May 2006 Brig. Gen. Seyoum Hagos 2,544 348 officers, 1108 
NCO, 1088 soldiers 
4 
27th PK Brigade March 2006- Oct 2006 Brig. Gen. Berhanu Jula 2,551 311 officers, 1168 
NCO, 1072 soldiers 
 
Total number of troops sent for peace operations is more than 22,000 (From 1951-to date) 
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APPENDIX B.   KOREAN WAR CASUALTY STATISTICS17 
(From: Korean war casualty statistics Copyright (C) Dongxiao Yue, 1999 Retrieved on Sept 3, 2006, from 
http://www.centurychina.com/history/krwarcost.html) 
 







Captured Total Comments 
S. Korea 227,800 717,100 43,500 ? 984,400 Captured included in 
MIA? 
US 54,229 103,248 8,142 3,746 169,365 KIA included the 20,600 
accidental fatality 
UK 710 2,278 1,263 766 5,017  
Turkey 717 2,246 167 217 3,349  
Australia 291 1,240 39 21 1,591  
Canada 309 1,055 30 2 1,396  
France 288 818 18 11 1,135  
Tailand 114 794 5 0 913  
Greece 169 543 2 1 715  
Holland 111 589 4 0 913  
Columbia 140 452 65 29 686  
Ethiopia* 120 536 656  
Philippines 92 299 57 40 488  
Belgium/Luxe 97 350 5 1 453  
New Zealand 34 80 1 115  
                                                 
17 Korean war casualty statistics Copyright (C) Dongxiao Yue, 1999 Retrieved on sept 3, 2006 from http://www.centurychina.com/history/krwarcost.html. 
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South Africa 20 16 6 42  
Japan Several 1  
  
PRC 132,000 238,400 8,000 21,400 392,600  
 
* The data shows that no one was missing in action or captured during the war in Korea
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APPENDIX C.   MAP OF UNMIL SECTOR 4, ETHIOPIAN DEPLOYMENT AS OF FEBRUARY 2005 
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